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This paper investigates the relationship between subsystems and time in a closed nonrelativistic
system of interacting bosons and fermions. It is possible to write any state vector in such a system
as an unentangled tensor product of subsystem vectors, and to do so in infinitely many ways. This
requires the superposition of different numbers of particles, but the theory can describe in full the
equivalence relation that leads to a particle-number superselection rule in conventionally defined
subsystems. Time is defined as a functional of subsystem changes, thus eliminating the need for any
reference to an external time variable. The dynamics of the unentangled subsystem decomposition
is derived from a variational principle of dynamical stability, which requires the decomposition to
change as little as possible in any given infinitesimal time interval, subject to the constraint that
the state of the total system satisfy the Schro¨dinger equation. The resulting subsystem dynamics
is deterministic. This determinism is regarded as a conceptual tool that observers can use to
make inferences about the outside world, not as a law of nature. The experiences of each observer
define some properties of that observer’s subsystem during an infinitesimal interval of time (i.e., the
present moment); everything else must be inferred from this information. The overall structure of
the theory has some features in common with quantum Bayesianism, the Everett interpretation, and
dynamical reduction models, but it differs significantly from all of these. The theory of information
described here is largely qualitative, as the most important equations have not yet been solved. The
quantitative level of agreement between theory and experiment thus remains an open question.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It seems to me that for a systematic founda-
tion of quantum mechanics one needs to be-
gin with the composition and decomposition
of quantum systems.
— W. Pauli [1–3]
In physics, as in everyday life, we must divide the world
conceptually into subsystems before we can say anything
about it. We cannot comprehend the undivided world;
we can only talk about how its parts differ from or change
relative to each other. In quantum mechanics the role of
subsystem decompositions is, if anything, even more im-
portant. As Wheeler has said, “we are first able to play
the game when with chalk we have drawn a line across
the empty courtyard” [4]. If we decline to draw such a
line, “then physics has vanished, and only a mathemati-
cal scheme remains” [5].
The “mathematical scheme” that Heisenberg refers to
is the Schro¨dinger equation for the time evolution of a
closed system. If the world is not divided into subsys-
tems, time may pass on a sheet of paper, but nothing
can be said to happen, as there is no point of contact
between theory and experiment. Indeed it is not even
clear what the time variable in the Schro¨dinger equation
means if one cannot talk about relative changes between
different parts of the system.
This paper explores the relationship between subsys-
tems and time in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. It
springs from an examination of four interrelated ques-
tions: (1) how to construct subsystem decompositions
without entanglement; (2) how to define time in a closed
system; (3) how to define a dynamics of interacting sub-
systems without entanglement; and (4) how to extract
information from these subsystems.
Cursory answers to these four questions are as follows:
(1) Unentangled subsystem decompositions can be con-
structed in Fock space, using superpositions of different
numbers of particles. (2) Time can be defined as a func-
tional of subsystem changes. (3) An entanglement-free
dynamics can be derived by maximizing the stability of
the subsystem decomposition. (4) An observer obtains
information from only one subsystem, and only during
the present moment of time. All else must be inferred.
A brief introduction to each of these four subject ar-
eas is given below. It must be emphasized at the outset
that this paper is exploratory in nature; the theory of
information presented here has not yet reached a stage
of development that would permit a direct comparison
with experiment.
A. Definition of subsystems
In quantum mechanics, subsystems are traditionally
defined using a tensor product of vector spaces [6]. Sub-
systems defined in this way inevitably become entangled
by interactions [7]. Although entanglement is now com-
monly regarded as a resource [8], its consequences still
leave many people uneasy with the foundations of quan-
tum mechanics [9–13].
But is this definition necessary? Another approach
has been advocated by Primas and Amann [14–28]. It
is based on the concept of a quantum object, which Pri-
mas defines as “an open quantum system which in spite
of its interaction with the environment is not [entangled]
with the environment” [15]. Objects may change their
properties but they are required to “keep their identity
in the course of time” [15]. The concept of an object is
similar to that of a quasiparticle [29–31]. However, quasi-
particles are designed to minimize interactions, whereas
objects are designed to minimize entanglement.
Algebraic “dressing” techniques have been developed
for the construction of quantum objects in some simple
models, but only in the context of certain approxima-
tions and asymptotic limits [14–28]. One approximation
considered essential by Primas is neglecting the Pauli ex-
clusion principle at the level of the interactions between
subsystems. Thus, electrons in different subsystems are
treated as distinguishable. However, this contradicts a
basic principle of elementary-particle physics.
Is it possible to construct quantum objects without
neglecting the Pauli exclusion principle? The answer is
yes, if we define a subsystem decomposition as a tensor
product of vectors rather than a tensor product of vector
spaces. Of course, the answer also depends on how we
define a system.
The system studied in this paper is a closed non-
relativistic system of interacting fermions and bosons.
The dimensions of the underlying single-particle Hilbert
3spaces are assumed to be finite; the dimension of the re-
sulting fermion Fock space is then finite too, but that of
the boson Fock space is infinite. For example, one might
consider a finite volume in coordinate space and cut off
wavelengths shorter than some given value. The use of
such a cutoff is congruent with the current understanding
of the standard model of elementary-particle physics as
an effective field theory [32]. Bell has called this type of
system a “serious part of quantum mechanics” that cov-
ers a “substantial fragment of physics” [33], thus making
it (in his opinion) a worthy object of study in the field of
quantum foundations [33, 34].
It is shown in Secs. II and III that any state vector |ψ〉
in such a system can be written exactly as an unentangled
tensor product of an arbitrary number of subsystem vec-
tors |uk〉. Furthermore, for any given number of subsys-
tems, this can be done in infinitely many ways. Despite
the lack of entanglement, knowledge of the whole (|ψ〉)
does not imply knowledge of the parts (|uk〉), because the
subsystem vectors are not confined to subspaces. On the
contrary, |uk〉 occupies the same Fock space as |ψ〉.
B. Definition of time
Such a decomposition is only meaningful if it persists
over time. A crucial question that must be addressed is
how to define time in a closed system without making
reference to an external time variable [35–51]. The given
subsystem decomposition is very useful in this regard. It
allows time to be defined as a functional that organizes
information about subsystem changes.
Section IV begins the preparatory work for this defini-
tion by developing ways to quantify differences between
subsystem decompositions. The main focus is on geomet-
ric concepts related to the Fubini–Study metric in Hilbert
space. Section V then defines time as a functional of two
infinitesimally different (but otherwise arbitrary) subsys-
tem decompositions. This functional is defined so as to
maximize the amount of change that can be expressed in
the form of Schro¨dinger dynamics. It is a functional of
the entire subsystem decomposition; this eliminates the
need to single out any particular subsystem as a clock.
C. Subsystem dynamics
The time functional can be used to formulate a dy-
namics of subsystems by means of a variational principle
of dynamical stability. This principle requires the subsys-
tem decomposition to change as little as possible in any
given infinitesimal time interval, subject to the constraint
that the total state vector |ψ〉 of the closed system sat-
isfy the Schro¨dinger equation. However, the interacting
subsystems derived from this principle do not satisfy the
Schro¨dinger equation.
The concept of subsystem dynamics does not even exist
in the usual tensor-product-of-vector-spaces formulation
of subsystems. The tensor-product decomposition is just
given arbitrarily, with no connection (in principle) be-
tween different times (although it is often taken to be
time independent). The subsystem dynamics developed
here (in Sec. VI) therefore has no parallel in orthodox
quantum mechanics.
Dynamically stable subsystems are quantum objects in
the sense defined above. Does this mean that their ob-
servable properties can be regarded as elements of a “free-
standing reality” [52, 53]? Deriving such a description
was in fact a large part of the original motivation for
this study. However, the answer turns out to be an em-
phatic no. Dynamically stable subsystems still have an
unavoidable element of subjectivity.
There are two fundamental reasons for this. One is
that the subjective choice of a number of subsystems is
essential to the dynamics. The results depend explicitly
on this number, and it has to be put in by hand. Its
value cannot be derived from the principle of dynamical
stability itself.
The second reason is that the resulting dynamics is
deterministic. This investigation began with a vague
expectation that the dynamical stability problem might
not have unique solutions, thereby necessitating the in-
troduction of “objective” probabilities at a fundamental
level. This could be regarded as a new type of deco-
herence mechanism that is inherent in the dynamics of
quantum objects.
However, this expectation proved to be false. The vari-
ation problem has a unique solution, so the resulting sub-
system dynamics is deterministic. This means that the
principle of dynamical stability cannot explain the lack
of determinism exemplified by the “quantum jumps” of
orthodox quantum mechanics [54, 55].
If the principle of dynamical stability cannot be re-
garded as the foundation for a law of nature, what is
it good for? It is essentially just a tool for observers
to use. They can use it to infer something about the
properties of subsystems in the past or the future from
whatever information they have about those subsystems
now. There is no guarantee that these inferences will
agree with their experiences, because the subsystem dy-
namics is not viewed as a law governing the behavior of
anything “real.” It is instead viewed as an instantiation
of Wheeler’s aphorism that “the only law is the law that
there is no law” [56]. That is, nature is not governed by
laws; laws are just useful conceptual tools.
How are these results affected by the inclusion of super-
selection rules [57–60]? One must be careful in answering
this question, because the standard rules are derived from
the tensor-product-of-subspaces definition of subsystems,
which is not relevant in the present context. (The stan-
dard rules are also highly controversial even in the proper
context [32, 61–75].) One must therefore go back to the
underlying cause of a superselection rule (i.e., the lack
of an external reference frame [74]) and reexamine its
consequences for the definition of subsystems used here.
In the absence of an external reference frame, cer-
4tain subsystem decompositions become observationally
indistinguishable from one another. One can account
for this indistinguishability by introducing equivalence
classes [76] of subsystem decompositions. For the ref-
erence frame that gives rise to a particle-number su-
perselection rule, the subsystem dynamics with or with-
out such equivalence classes is qualitatively the same, as
shown in Sec. VII. That is, the dynamics remains fully
deterministic. However, the quantitative dynamics can
be quite different in these two cases.
An intriguing consequence of the Pauli exclusion prin-
ciple is that the subsystem dynamics depends on the or-
der in which the subsystem states |uk〉 are multiplied.
Ignoring this ordering would give rise to an apparent de-
coherence effect. However, when the ordering of subsys-
tems is accounted for, the subsystem dynamics remains
deterministic, as shown in Sec. VIII.
D. Information about subsystems
Section IX addresses the question of precisely how in-
ferences are to be drawn from information about the
properties of subsystems. Because the subsystems are
not entangled, we can use the methods of Bayesian infer-
ence familiar from classical probability theory [77–82].
This automatically ensures compliance with Bohr’s in-
junction that “however far the phenomena transcend the
scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all
evidence must be expressed in classical terms” [83, 84].
These subsystems are nonclassical, but due to their
lack of entanglement, their properties can be regarded
as “beables” rather than “observables” (in the sense of
Bell [13]). That is, the subsystems can be considered to
have certain properties, independently of whether they
are “measured.” However, it should be emphasized that
these properties are in general only inferred to exist, and
that they are contextual in the sense that they depend
on the subjective choice of a number of subsystems. As
noted above, they cannot be regarded as elements of a
free-standing reality.
How are we to reconcile the determinism of the sub-
system dynamics with the “quantum jumps” of textbook
quantum mechanics? This can be done by imposing lim-
itations on the information an observer has access to.
An observer is assumed to experience directly only those
beables associated with one subsystem, and only for an
infinitesimal interval of time. This interval is called the
present moment of time. The properties of all other sub-
systems, as well as those of the observer’s own subsystem
in the past and future of the present moment, must be
inferred from this information.
These limitations are not due to an observer’s igno-
rance, in the literal sense of ignoring possibly accessible
information. The observer simply has no access to any-
thing other than her own experiences. These experiences
are not predicted by anything in the theory. The de-
gree to which an observer’s inferences of an outside world
match her experiences in successive present moments de-
termines how useful her image of this outside world is.
The degree of mismatch can be regarded as an effective
“quantum jump.”
The conceptual structure of this theory of information
draws heavily upon the ideas of quantum Bayesianism
(or QBism) developed by Caves, Fuchs, Schack, and Mer-
min [53, 85–94]. The main difference is that an observer
is treated not as a black box but as a subsystem like
any other. This allows multiple observers to be treated
as equals, thus providing a framework for meaningful
descriptions of intersubjective agreement. “Objective”
properties can then be defined as those features of the
common worldview that survive when more observers are
added to the framework.
The theory of information is developed only to the level
of a bare skeleton, however, because I have not solved the
resulting system of equations. The discussion of this part
of the theory is therefore mostly qualitative, and no proof
can be offered that it leads to predictions in agreement
with experiment. The challenge of adding flesh to this
skeleton nevertheless opens up many promising avenues
for future research.
E. A guide for the reader
As an aid to navigation, this subsection indicates which
parts of the paper are most essential on a first reading.
Overall, the most difficult parts are those dealing with
technical details of boson vector spaces; these are largely
relegated to a series of appendices. On a first reading,
one should focus attention primarily on the properties of
systems containing only fermions.
The beginning of Sec. II shows that, contrary to state-
ments in the literature, systems of indistinguishable par-
ticles do have a tensor product structure. Readers who
are willing to take this for granted can go straight to
Eqs. (2.22)–(2.25), referring back to earlier material as
needed for definitions of notation. The paragraph below
Eq. (2.29) establishes when a fermion creator is invert-
ible. Equation (2.34) shows that for systems contain-
ing bosons, the complex numbers in the fermion matrix
(2.29) are replaced by commuting operators.
Section III explains why invertibility of subsystems is
important and develops some mathematical tools for in-
version. Readers who are willing to take invertibility for
granted can go straight to the exponential representa-
tion of Eqs. (3.16) and (3.19). The definition of the word
“quasiclassical” and its relation to classical probability
theory in Sec. III F are also worth noting.
Section IV deals with various kinematical aspects of
the definition of subsystems. The definition of observable
quantities in Secs. IV A and IV B should be included in
a first reading, but Secs. IV C and IV D can be glossed
over and referred back to when needed. The geometric
properties defined in Sec. IV E are essential as they are
used throughout the rest of the paper.
5Section V develops various connections between sub-
systems and time. Those willing to accept that interact-
ing subsystems never satisfy the Schro¨dinger equation
can skip Sec. V A. The remaining subsections all contain
essential material. The key ideas of Sec. V C are the con-
ceptual foundation for the time functional in Eqs. (5.9)
and (5.11) and the resulting functional in Eq. (5.16). The
central result of Sec. V D is the inequality (5.29).
The topic of Sec. VI is subsystem dynamics. The con-
cept of dynamical stability is quantified in Eq. (6.2) of
Sec. VI A. The simple case of a time-independent total
system state |ψ〉 is considered first in Sec. VI B. The so-
lution for the unique maximum of the dynamical stabil-
ity functional is given in Eq. (6.15). The extension to
time-dependent |ψ〉 in Secs. VI C, VI D, and VI E can be
glossed over on a first reading. The main result, shown
in Eq. (6.46), is qualitatively the same as the previous
solution (6.15), apart from a necessary change of nota-
tion. Section VI F can be skipped on a first reading, but
the results of Sec. VI G are essential for understanding
why the subsystem decompositions used here cannot be
considered objective.
Section VII discusses a system lacking a phase refer-
ence, which would lead to a particle-number superselec-
tion rule in textbook quantum mechanics. In such a sys-
tem, the time functional (5.16) can be replaced with the
renormalized functional (7.27). After a similar renormal-
ization of other variables, the overall solution for the dy-
namically stable subsystem change has the same form as
before [i.e., Eq. (6.46)]. This is an important result, but
the details of the derivation are not needed in any later
sections of the paper. The same is true for Sec. VIII,
which deals with the effect of subsystem permutations
on subsystem dynamics.
Section IX describes how information is extracted from
the preceding theory. It contains many key concepts but
only one equation, so it can be read in its entirety the
first time around. The same is true for the conclusions
in Sec. X.
II. TENSOR PRODUCTS AND
INDISTINGUISHABLE PARTICLES
The purpose of this section is to define clearly what
is meant by the tensor product of many-particle quan-
tum states. Only a small part of the material presented
here is entirely new, but establishing a clear notation at
the outset helps to simplify calculations in subsequent
sections of the paper.
The most convenient tensor product for systems of
many indistinguishable particles has an additional alge-
braic structure that accounts for symmetry or antisym-
metry with respect to particle permutations. The precise
form of this algebra is defined uniquely by the geometry
of Hilbert space, in the form of a cluster decomposition
property for the inner product in Fock space. The result-
ing tensor algebra is the same as that of particle creation
operators in Fock space. Special care is needed to ensure
closure of the algebra for systems containing bosons.
A. Definition of a tensor product
Given two vector spaces V1 and V2, the tensor product
of vectors |u〉 ∈ V1 and |v〉 ∈ V2 is written as |u〉 ⊗ |v〉.
The tensor product is bilinear but not commutative [95].
That is, it must be distributive over vector addition:
|u〉 ⊗ (|v〉+ |w〉) = |u〉 ⊗ |v〉+ |u〉 ⊗ |w〉, (2.1a)
(|u〉+ |z〉)⊗ |v〉 = |u〉 ⊗ |v〉+ |z〉 ⊗ |v〉, (2.1b)
as well as bilinear with respect to scalar multiplication:
α(|u〉 ⊗ |v〉) = (α|u〉)⊗ |v〉 = |u〉 ⊗ (α|v〉). (2.2)
The set of linear combinations of such tensor products
defines the vector space V1 ⊗ V2. The tensor product of
three or more vectors is associative:
(|u〉 ⊗ |v〉)⊗ |w〉 = |u〉 ⊗ (|v〉 ⊗ |w〉), (2.3)
thus defining the vector space V1 ⊗ V2 ⊗ V3 uniquely.
B. Indistinguishable particles
The vector space for a system of n identical particles
is
Hn = H⊗H⊗ · · · ⊗ H︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
, (2.4)
in which H is the Hilbert space of a single particle. The
Fock space F(H) for a system with an indefinite number
of identical particles is defined as the direct sum [96–98]
F(H) =
∞⊕
n=0
Hn = H0 ⊕H⊕H2 ⊕ · · · , (2.5)
where the zero-particle space H0 consists of all scalar
multiples of the vacuum state |0〉 (the null vector is writ-
ten as 0). In the tensor algebra of Fock space, |0〉 is the
multiplicative identity:
|0〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉 = |ψ〉 ∀|ψ〉 ∈ F(H). (2.6)
By construction, F(H) is therefore closed under tensor
multiplication [99]:
F(H)⊗F(H) = F(H). (2.7)
According to the symmetrization postulate [100, 101],
the only physically meaningful states in F(H) are those
satisfying the symmetry condition
S|ψ〉 = |ψ〉, (2.8)
6where S is a projector for states of appropriate symmetry
(i.e., totally symmetric for bosons and totally antisym-
metric for fermions). It is defined by
S =
∞∑
n=0
ΠnSnΠn, Sn =
1
n!
∑
σ
ε(σ)σ, (2.9)
in which Πn is the projector for the n-particle subspace
Hn and Sn is the projector for the symmetric or anti-
symmetric states of Hn (with S0 = S1 = 1). The sum
over σ covers the n! permutation operators in Hn. For
fermions, ε(σ) is the sign of the permutation σ:
ε(σ) =
{
+1 if σ is even,
−1 if σ is odd. (2.10)
For bosons, ε(σ) = 1. The subspace of vectors in F(H)
that satisfy the symmetry constraint (2.8) is denoted
Fs(H), while the corresponding subspace of Hn is de-
noted S(Hn).
C. The ψ product
It is convenient at this point to introduce another ten-
sor product that automatically accounts for all symmetry
requirements. This binary operator is defined by
|u(p)〉  |v(q)〉 = c(p, q)S(|u(p)〉 ⊗ |v(q)〉), (2.11)
in which |u(p)〉 ∈ S(Hp), |v(q)〉 ∈ S(Hq), and c(p, q) is a
numerical coefficient to be defined below. The linearity of
S and bilinearity of |u〉⊗|v〉 then give a unique extension
of |u〉  |v〉 to the case of general |u〉, |v〉 ∈ Fs(H).
For fermions, |u〉  |v〉 is the same as the exterior or
wedge product |u〉 ∧ |v〉 [95, 102–106], while for bosons,
|u〉  |v〉 is known as the symmetric product [95, 104–
106]. For brevity, the name “ψ product” is used here as
an umbrella term covering both cases in the context of
many-particle quantum states of generic symmetry. Note
that the ψ product is commutative only for bosons, since
[95, 103–106]
|u(p)〉  |v(q)〉 = ζpq |v(q)〉  |u(p)〉, (2.12)
where ζ = +1 for bosons and ζ = −1 for fermions.
The coefficient c(p, q) is partially defined by requiring
the ψ product to be associative. As shown in Appendix
A, this requires c(p, q) to have the form [104]
c(p, q) =
f(p+ q)
f(p)f(q)
, (2.13)
in which f(1) = 1 but f(n) is otherwise arbitrary. Most
authors choose either f(n) = 1 [95, 105] or f(n) = n!
[102–104, 106].
However, for applications in quantum mechanics, it is
more convenient to choose f(n) =
√
n! [107], due to the
following cluster decomposition theorem. The theorem
refers to a case in which H = H1 ⊕ H2, where the sub-
spaces H1 and H2 are orthogonal. The Fock space there-
fore factors as Fs(H) = Fs(H1)Fs(H2).
Theorem 1 (Cluster decomposition) Let
|st〉 = |s〉  |t〉 and |uv〉 = |u〉  |v〉 be vectors in
Fs(H), where |s〉, |u〉 ∈ Fs(H1) and |t〉, |v〉 ∈ Fs(H2).
Then the inner product 〈st|uv〉 factors as
〈st|uv〉 = 〈s|u〉〈t|v〉 (2.14)
for all such vectors if and only if |f(n)| = √n!.
The factorization (2.14) is called a cluster decomposition
[108] because the subspaces H1 and H2 typically refer
to different regions in coordinate space. Theorem 1 is
proved in Appendix B.
The phase of f(n) is not determined by this theorem.
However, choosing f(n) to be real and positive means
that the coefficient of |u(p)〉 ⊗ |v(q)〉 in |u(p)〉  |v(q)〉 is
also real and positive.
The ψ product is required here to have the cluster
decomposition property and to satisfy this phase con-
vention. The coefficient in equation (2.11) is thus given
uniquely by
c(p, q) =
√
(p+ q)!
p!q!
. (2.15)
It is sometimes said that “a tensor-product structure
is not present” in systems of indistinguishable particles
[109]. This is misleading, however, because the ψ product
has all of the essential properties of a tensor product
(see Sec. II A). Only the physically meaningless tensor-
product structure of a system of distinguishable particles
is lacking.
D. Subsystem creators
The algebra of the ψ product defined above is the same
as the familiar algebra of particle creation operators in
Fock space. To see this, one can start by defining a gen-
eral n-particle ψ product
|α1α2 · · ·αn〉 = |α1〉  |α2〉  · · ·  |αn〉, (2.16)
in which |αk〉 ∈ H, and the set {|αk〉} is not assumed
to be linearly independent or normalized. This vector
is related to the corresponding unsymmetrized n-particle
tensor product by
|α1α2 · · ·αn〉 =
√
n!S(|α1〉 ⊗ |α2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αn〉), (2.17)
which follows from the definition of |u〉|v〉 in Eqs. (2.11)
and (2.15). The product of two such states has the com-
position property (due to associativity)
|α1 · · ·αp〉  |β1 · · ·βq〉 = |α1 · · ·αpβ1 · · ·βq〉. (2.18)
7Consider now the case in which the set {|αk〉} is or-
thonormal, with repetition of the same state permitted.
Let nα be the number of times a particular state |α〉 ∈ H
occurs in equation (2.16), with
∑
α nα = n. For fermions,|α〉  |α〉 = 0, so values of nα > 1 merely give rise to the
null vector. Excluding such cases, the normalization of
the vector (2.16) is given by [96]
〈α1 · · ·αn|α1 · · ·αn〉 =
∏
α
nα! . (2.19)
That is, nonzero fermion states are normalized to unity,
but this is true for bosons only if no single-particle state is
repeated. Unit vectors are useful in some contexts (e.g.,
Appendix C), but here the normalization (2.19) is more
convenient.
The particle creation operator a†λ can now be defined
as [96]
a†λ|λ1 · · ·λn〉 = |λ〉  |λ1 · · ·λn〉 = |λλ1 · · ·λn〉, (2.20)
which maps S(Hn) into S(Hn+1). The vectors {|λi〉}
need not be orthonormal, although the operator commu-
tation relations are simpler if they are [96]. A product
of creation operators can thus be used to generate any
simple product state from the vacuum:
|λ1 · · ·λn〉 = a†λ1 · · · a
†
λn
|0〉. (2.21)
The absence of numerical factors in this equation is due
to the fact that no normalization convention is imposed
on |λ1 · · ·λn〉 [96].
Any vector |u〉 ∈ Fs(H) can therefore be generated
from the vacuum by
|u〉 = U |0〉, (2.22)
in which U is a linear combination of products of creation
operators, including (in general) a scalar term for the
creation of no particles. For convenience, the operator
U is called the creator of the state |u〉. The lengthier
phrase “creation operator” is reserved for the creator a†λ
of a single-particle state |λ〉; thus, the set of creation
operators is a proper subset of the creators.
Given another such state |v〉 = V |0〉, the ψ product of
|u〉 and |v〉 is
|u〉  |v〉 = (U |0〉) |v〉 (2.23a)
= U(|0〉  |v〉) (2.23b)
= U |v〉 (2.23c)
= UV |0〉. (2.23d)
The algebra of the vectors |u〉 and |v〉 is therefore the
same as the algebra of the creators U and V . This can
be seen even more clearly when a redundant vacuum state
is appended to |v〉:
|u〉  |v〉  |0〉 = UV |0〉. (2.24)
This result can be extended to any number of ψ products;
for example, if |w〉 = W |0〉, then
|u〉  |v〉  |w〉  |0〉 = UVW |0〉. (2.25)
Of course, it is only meaningful to write such equations
if the vector defined by this product is normalizable. No
difficulty arises for fermions, because the dimension of
the fermion Fock space is finite; fermion creation oper-
ators are therefore bounded. However, boson creators
are unbounded (with respect to the topology defined by
the usual Hilbert space norm); the ψ product of two nor-
malized boson vectors could therefore be unnormalizable.
One must take care to choose a boson vector space that
is closed under the ψ product.
The construction of such a vector space is described
in Appendix C. The result, denoted Fψ(Hb), is a dense
subspace of Fs(Hb), where Hb is the Hilbert space of a
single boson. It should be noted that Fψ(Hb) is a Fre´chet
space [97, 110] rather than a Hilbert space. This distinc-
tion can be ignored for many purposes, because the inner
product from Fs(Hb) remains well defined in the sub-
space Fψ(Hb); the only change is that the Fre´chet-space
topology is not defined by this inner product.
E. Matrix notation for fermions
In a fermion system, the Fock space has a finite dimen-
sion 2d, in which d is the dimension of the single-fermion
Hilbert space Hf . It is therefore convenient to introduce
matrix representations for the (always bounded) fermion
creators U and V .
Let Hf be spanned by an orthonormal basis {|ek〉}, in
which k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , d − 1}. The Fock space Fs(Hf)
is then spanned by the basis {|fi〉}, where the integer
i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2d − 1} has the binary representation
i =
d−1∑
k=0
ik2
k (ik ∈ {0, 1}), (2.26)
in which ik is the kth binary digit of i. If ik = 1, the
state |ek〉 is occupied in |fi〉; otherwise, it is unoccupied.
Thus, for example, when d = 4, the basis vector |f5〉 can
be written in various ways as
|f5〉 = |0101〉 = |e2〉  |e0〉. (2.27)
In this notation, |f0〉 is just the vacuum state |0〉.
As a simple example, consider the case d = 2, for which
a general vector |u〉 ∈ Fs(Hf) can be written as
|u〉 =
3∑
i=0
ci|fi〉, ci ≡ 〈fi|u〉. (2.28)
The ψ products of |u〉 with the basis vectors of Fs(Hf) are
then given by |u〉|f0〉 = |u〉, |u〉|f1〉 = c0|f1〉+c2|f3〉,
8|u〉  |f2〉 = c0|f2〉 − c1|f3〉, and |u〉  |f3〉 = c0|f3〉. The
matrix representing U in this basis is therefore
U =
c0 0 0 0c1 c0 0 0c2 0 c0 0
c3 c2 −c1 c0
 . (2.29)
In general, U has the form of a lower triangular matrix
whenever the basis {|fi〉} is arranged in order of nonde-
creasing particle number |i| ≡ ∑d−1k=0 ik. (Such an ar-
rangement is called graded lexicographic ordering [111].)
Hence, U is invertible if and only if c0 6= 0, since the
determinant of a triangular matrix is just the product of
its diagonal elements.
F. Different types of particles
Up to this point it has tacitly been assumed that the
system under consideration contains only one type of
particle. To combine different types of either bosons or
fermions, one can simply take a direct sum of the single-
particle Hilbert spaces before constructing the Fock space
[112]. All boson (fermion) creation operators then com-
mute (anticommute) with each other. Such a description
is possible because the operators for different fermions
can be chosen arbitrarily to either commute or anticom-
mute [113, 114]. (These two choices are related by a
Jordan–Wigner transformation [115–119].)
In this mode of description, which is commonly used in
the treatment of isospin [100, 112, 113], there are only two
types of particles: bosons and fermions. Different types
of bosons or different types of fermions are treated as
formally indistinguishable; the distinction is maintained
only at the level of quantum numbers within the single-
particle Hilbert spaces Hb and Hf [120].
Bosons and fermions are combined together into one
system by means of an ordinary (unsymmetrized) tensor
product. A general vector in the tensor-product space
E = Fψ(Hb)⊗Fs(Hf) (2.30)
is thus of the form
|u〉 =
∞∑
j=0
2d−1∑
i=0
cji|bj〉 ⊗ |fi〉, (2.31)
in which {|bj〉} and {|fi〉} are fixed orthonormal bases
for the boson and fermion Fock spaces (see Sec. II E for
the definition of {|fi〉}). This can also be written as
|u〉 =
2d−1∑
i=0
|ui〉 ⊗ |fi〉, (2.32)
in which |ui〉 =
∑
j cji|bj〉. This is not a Schmidt decom-
position, since the basis {|fi〉} is independent of |u〉; the
set {|ui〉} is therefore generally not orthonormal.
In the matrix notation of Sec. II E, |u〉 can be writ-
ten as a 2d-component “spinor,” given here explicitly (in
decimal and binary) for the case d = 2:
|u〉 =
|u0〉|u1〉|u2〉
|u3〉
 =
|u00〉|u01〉|u10〉
|u11〉
 . (2.33)
The boson-fermion creator U then has the form
U =
U0 0 0 0U1 U0 0 0U2 0 U0 0
U3 U2 −U1 U0
 , (2.34)
in which the constants ci of Eq. (2.29) are replaced by
boson creators Ui (defined by |ui〉 = Ui|0〉b).
As shown in Appendix D, the definition of the ψ prod-
uct |u〉|v〉 can easily be extended to the vector space E .
All of the main conclusions of Secs. II C and II D, includ-
ing the cluster decomposition property and the algebraic
equivalence shown in Eq. (2.25), remain valid in E .
III. BASIC TOOLS FOR SUBSYSTEM
ANALYSIS
Let us turn now to an investigation of the conditions
under which a general ket |ψ〉 ∈ E can be written as a
ψ product of the form |ψ〉 = |u〉  |v〉. This equation is
equivalent to the operator product
Ψ = UV, (3.1)
in which Ψ, U , and V are the creators of the states |ψ〉,
|u〉, and |v〉, respectively.
A. Invertible subsystem creators
Such an equation can clearly be written for any invert-
ible subsystem creator U , since one can then take
V = U−1Ψ (3.2)
for arbitrary Ψ. Likewise, if V is invertible, one can al-
ways let U = ΨV −1. This approach can easily be ex-
tended to more general products such as Ψ = UVW ,
since (for example) if U and W are invertible one can
always let V = U−1ΨW−1.
Under what conditions is a creator invertible? This
question has already been answered for fermion systems;
in Sec. II E, it was noted that a fermion creator U is
invertible if and only if c0 6= 0, where c0 = 〈f0|u〉 = 〈0|u〉
is the vacuum component of |u〉. Invertibility is thus a
weak constraint: the set of invertible fermion creators is
uncountable and forms a smooth manifold.
A similar condition can be derived for systems con-
taining both bosons and fermions. The main result is
expressed here in the form of a theorem (proved in Ap-
pendix E), using the notation of Sec. II F.
9Theorem 2 (Invertibility) For a boson-fermion cre-
ator U , the following statements are equivalent: (a) The
linear map U : E → E is invertible. (b) The associated
boson creator U0 : Fψ → Fψ is invertible. (c) The corre-
sponding boson state |u0〉 = U0|0〉b is a coherent state.
The coherent states mentioned in part (c) of the theo-
rem are just the familiar Glauber states [96, 121–126], as
defined in Eq. (C10) of Appendix C.
The constraint imposed by Theorem 2 remains very
weak. For U to be invertible, the boson state |u0〉 as-
sociated with the fermion vacuum |f0〉 = |0〉f must be a
coherent state, but all of the other kets |ui〉 in Eq. (2.32)
(i.e., those with i 6= 0) are completely arbitrary.
B. Why invertibility is important
Equation (3.2) is not the most general solution of Eq.
(3.1). The most general solution has the form [127–130]
V = U−Ψ + (1− U−U)Y, (3.3)
in which U− is a generalized inverse of U [127–130] and
the creator Y is arbitrary. For finite-dimensional matri-
ces, such a solution exists if and only if Ψ ∈ imU , where
imU denotes the image (or range) of U . When U is in-
vertible, Eq. (3.3) reduces to Eq. (3.2), but invertibility
of U is not necessary for the existence of the solution
(3.3).
Nevertheless, all subsequent analysis in this paper is
based on the study of invertible subsystem creators. This
is done for two reasons. The first is simply the pragmatic
reason that the algebra of the subsystem creators is much
simpler when invertibility is assumed at the outset.
The second reason is more technical but also more com-
pelling. For simplicity, consider the Moore–Penrose gen-
eralized inverse A− of a finite-dimensional square matrix
A [127–129]. In this case, (A+ δA)− is well known to be
continuous at δA = 0 if and only if the rank of (A+ δA)
is the same as the rank of A for all perturbations δA in
some finite neighborhood of δA = 0 [127–129]. But if A
does not have full rank, there exist matrices A+ δA with
rank(A + δA) > rankA for arbitrarily small ‖δA‖ > 0.
Hence, (A+ δA)− is continuous at δA = 0 if and only if
A has full rank—i.e., if and only if A is invertible.
Continuity of the subsystem (3.3) is essential because
the subsystem dynamics in Sec. VI is derived from a
variational principle. In order for subsystems to be sta-
tionary states of the dynamical stability functional, they
must first be continuous with respect to small variations.
Subsystems derived from generalized inverses are conse-
quently not used in this paper.
A simple corollary of Theorem 2 is that all invertible
subsystems must have a vacuum component. This im-
plies that all nontrivial (i.e., not purely vacuum) invert-
ible subsystems must have an indefinite number of par-
ticles. A pragmatic reason for allowing this type of sub-
system was pointed out by Bell [131]:
The real world is made of electrons and pro-
tons and so on, and as a result the bound-
aries of natural objects are fuzzy, and some
particles in the boundary can only doubt-
fully be assigned to either object or environ-
ment. I think that fundamental physical the-
ory should be so formulated that such artifi-
cial divisions are manifestly inessential.
The superposition of different numbers of particles is
therefore essential to the definition of the subsystems
considered here. This does not imply that the physi-
cal limitations leading to particle-number superselection
rules must be ignored in this theory. A detailed discus-
sion of this topic is, however, postponed until Sec. VII.
C. Functions of subsystem creators
Before writing down any formulas for the inverse of a
creator, it is helpful to start by establishing some general
properties of creators and functions of creators. Creators
are actually easier to work with than generic operators.
The reason for this is that any creator A can be decom-
posed into even and odd parts:
A = A+ +A−, (3.4)
in which A+ (A−) comprises all terms with an even (odd)
number of fermion creation operators. From Eq. (2.12)
we see that an even creator commutes with any creator,
whereas two odd creators anticommute:
A+B± = B±A+, A−B− = −B−A−. (3.5)
The commutator [A,B] ≡ AB − BA of two creators is
therefore given by
[A,B] = 2A−B−, (3.6)
which commutes with any other creator C, since A−B−
is even. Equation (3.5) also implies that all odd creators
are nilpotent:
A2− = 0. (3.7)
The binomial expansion of any integer power of a creator
thus contains only two terms:
An = (A+ +A−)n = An+ + nA
n−1
+ A−. (3.8)
All functions f(A) defined by a power series can be ex-
panded likewise as
f(A) = f(A+) +A−f ′(A+), (3.9)
in which f ′(x) = df/dx.
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D. Inversion formula
Let us now return to the case of an invertible creator
U . Given that U0 is invertible, we can write U as
U = U0(1 + Z) = (1 + Z)U0, (3.10)
in which Z ≡ U−10 U − 1 = UU−10 − 1. Calculating U−10
is trivial, because the operator U0 for a coherent state is
an exponential function [see Eq. (C10)]. In the matrix
notation of Eq. (2.34), Z has the same lower-triangular
form as U :
Z =
Z0 0 0 0Z1 Z0 0 0Z2 0 Z0 0
Z3 Z2 −Z1 Z0
 (for d = 2). (3.11)
The key difference is that Z0 = 0, by definition of Z. The
operator Z is therefore nilpotent—i.e., Zk = 0 for some
finite integer k. Since the matrix size is 2d × 2d, we see
immediately that k ≤ 2d.
However, we can obtain a stronger bound on k by not-
ing from Eq. (3.7) that the square of any monomial func-
tion of the fermion creation operators is also zero. Since
the maximum degree of any such monomial is d, inspec-
tion of Eq. (3.8) shows that
Zk = 0 ∀k > d(d/2)e, (3.12)
in which dxe is the ceiling function. One can then use
the geometric series to obtain the inversion formula
U−1 = U−10
d(d/2)e∑
n=0
(−1)nZn. (3.13)
E. The exponential representation
In a similar fashion, we can use Eq. (3.10) to calculate
the logarithm of U :
lnU = lnU0 + ln(1 + Z), (3.14)
in which ln(1 + Z) is given by the power series
ln(1 + Z) =
d(d/2)e∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
n
Zn. (3.15)
Every invertible creator can therefore be represented as
an exponential function:
U = expX = eX0e(X−X0)
= eX0
d(d/2)e∑
n=0
(X −X0)n
n!
, (3.16)
in which X = lnU . The intermediate steps in Eq. (3.16)
used the facts that X0 = lnU0 is even and that X −X0
is nilpotent.
The exponential representation (3.16) plays a crucial
role in the remainder of this paper. For both computation
and analysis, it is preferable to take the creator X as
fundamental and define the subsystem U as U = expX.
This guarantees that regardless of any changes in X, U
always remains invertible, its inverse being given simply
by U−1 = exp(−X). In this approach, the inversion
formula (3.13) becomes redundant.
The Campbell–Baker–Hausdorff formula for two cre-
ators A and B can now be used to show that
eAeB = eA+B+[A,B]/2 = eA+B+A−B−
= eA+BeA−B− = eA+B(1 +A−B−), (3.17)
in which Eq. (3.6) and (A−B−)2 = 0 were used. Adding
eAeB and eBeA then yields the very useful formula
eA+B = {eA, eB}, (3.18)
in which {A,B} ≡ 12 (AB+BA) denotes the symmetrized
product. As a special case of Eq. (3.18), note that if A is
varied by δA, the corresponding first-order variation in
eA is given by
δ(eA) ≡ eA+δA − eA
= {eδA − 1, eA}
= {δA, eA}, (3.19)
in which terms of second and higher order in δA were dis-
carded in the final step. This yields a simple expression
for the derivative of eA with respect to a parameter s:
∂
∂s
(eA) =
{
∂A
∂s
, eA
}
. (3.20)
This result is much simpler than the corresponding for-
mulas for a general operator A [132]. Several other identi-
ties for the symmetrized product of creators are collected
together in Appendix F.
F. Quasiclassical subsystems
The representation of quantum states by exponential
functions has a long history, dating back at least to the
WKB approximation of 1926. The modern theory of gen-
eralized coherent states [122, 124–126] also relies heavily
on exponential representations. In the latter approach,
the coherent states are tied to a particular Lie group
(namely, the dynamical group associated with the Hamil-
tonian of the total system), and the exponential functions
used to construct the coherent states are unitary opera-
tors involving both creation and annihilation operators.
Such unitary operators have the advantage of convenient
normalization properties, but they are not useful in the
present context because their algebra is not isomorphic
to the algebra of the ψ product.
The exponential representation (3.16) can be viewed as
a further generalization of the coherent-state concept, in
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that the creator X is not tied to any Lie group. Indeed,
X is almost entirely arbitrary, the only restrictions being
the algebraic closure constraint of Appendix C (which
requires all ψ products of subsystems to be normalizable)
and the invertibility constraint requiring U0 = expX0 to
be a Glauber coherent state (C10) (which implies that X0
is a linear function of the boson creation operators). But
the latter constraint is not independent of the former,
because the algebraic closure condition of Appendix C
was used in Appendix E to derive the linearity of X0.
Subsystems permitting an exponential representation
U = expX will be referred to as quasiclassical subsys-
tems in this paper. However, since the word “quasiclassi-
cal” has various other connotations (including the WKB
approximation and the Glauber coherent states [6]), it is
important to be clear about the sense in which this label
is being used here. In this paper, “quasiclassical” is just
a synonym for “invertible.”
This sense of the word quasiclassical does not imply the
use of any approximation. As emphasized in Sec. III A,
the product Ψ = UV provides an exact representation
for arbitrary states Ψ. As discussed in Sec. III B, invert-
ibility of U is the minimal restriction needed to ensure
continuity of V when U is varied and Ψ is held constant.
Note that when U is taken to be quasiclassical, V is qua-
siclassical if and only if Ψ is quasiclassical—but Ψ need
not be quasiclassical.
The fact that all coherent states are invertible is one
possible reason for designating the latter as quasiclas-
sical. A more significant reason is that the existence
of an unentangled product |ψ〉 = |u〉  |v〉 permits the
use of classical probability theory. Since different sub-
system decompositions |u〉  |v〉 are mutually exclusive
alternatives for the representation of |ψ〉, one’s state of
knowledge or belief about the suitability of various de-
compositions can be described using ordinary Bayesian
probability theory. The implications of this idea are de-
veloped further in the next section.
IV. KINEMATICS OF SUBSYSTEMS
WITHOUT SUBSPACES
This section explores several topics that are indepen-
dent of and logically prior to any concept of subsystem
dynamics, thus falling into the category of kinematics.
These include the definition of observable quantities, the
description of differences between two subsystem decom-
positions, and subsystem geometry.
For generality, let |ψ〉 be decomposed into a product
of m subsystems, where m ≥ 2:
|ψ〉 = |u1〉  |u2〉  · · ·  |um〉. (4.1)
Here and below, the subscript k in |uk〉 is just a label for
the m different subsystems (k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}). The sub-
scripts introduced previously in Eq. (2.32) are henceforth
retired as they have no further use.
A. Observables and beables
Given such a subsystem decomposition, how are we to
define the observable quantities of the theory?
A fundamental hypothesis of the present paper is that
all observables are calculated from the subsystem vectors
|uk〉. In other words, no observable quantity is calculated
directly from the total system vector |ψ〉. This is not
to say that |ψ〉 is meaningless; the subsystem dynamics
depends on |ψ〉. However, |ψ〉 does not appear anywhere
in the definition of observables.
Apart from this change, the mathematical apparatus
used to define observables is nearly the same as that in or-
dinary many-particle quantum mechanics [96, 123, 133].
That is, observables are represented by hermitian oper-
ators A that are totally symmetric with respect to per-
mutations of identical particles. For each such operator,
one can calculate a number
〈A〉k ≡ 〈uk|A|uk〉〈uk|uk〉 (4.2)
for each subsystem |uk〉. In ordinary quantum mechanics,
only the eigenvalues of A are observable; the numbers
〈A〉k are therefore interpreted as mean values.
Here, however, the numbers 〈A〉k are taken to be di-
rectly observable. This means that observables are de-
fined using what Bell has called the “density of stuff”
interpretation [33], first introduced by Schro¨dinger [134,
135]. A similar mass-density interpretation has been used
in the dynamical reduction theory of Ghirardi et al. [136–
138], but here 〈A〉k can describe properties other than
mass density.
According to Bell [13], the numbers 〈A〉k can then be
classified as “beables” rather than observables. That is,
subsystem |uk〉 is taken to possess the property 〈A〉k in-
dependently of any measurement (the concept of “mea-
surement” having no place in the fundamental postulates
of the theory).
Such an interpretation of 〈A〉k is possible for the reason
already explained in Sec. III F—namely, that different
subsystem decompositions can be described using classi-
cal probability theory. Without entanglement, there is no
need for the properties of the subsystems to be described
as potential rather than actual.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether this inter-
pretation of 〈A〉k can give rise to experimental predic-
tions similar to those obtained from ordinary quantum
mechanics. This is a difficult problem for which only
qualitative results are obtained in this paper. Further
discussion of this topic is presented in Sec. IX.
B. Relational properties
One aspect of observables that deserves special atten-
tion is that not all quantities 〈A〉k are necessarily observ-
able. For example, since the total system is taken to be
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closed (i.e., not interacting with anything else), quanti-
ties such as absolute position or orientation in space have
no meaning within the theory. One can of course calcu-
late numbers for these quantities within a given model,
but such numbers are meaningless due to the lack of any
external reference frame.
The only meaningful properties are therefore relational
properties. For example, although the absolute position
of the center of mass of a given subsystem is meaning-
less, it is meaningful to talk about the relative distance
between the centers of mass of two subsystems. Another
meaningful quantity would be the mass density of a sub-
system relative to the position of its own center of mass.
This type of restriction has received much attention
lately in regard to the connection between reference
frames (or their lack) and superselection rules [74]. The
consequences of such restrictions within the present the-
ory will be investigated in detail (for a specific example)
in Sec. VII. Until then, however, it will be assumed that
there are no restrictions (in principle) on the observable
quantities 〈A〉k.
C. Subsystem permutations
Let us now return to the subsystem decomposition
(4.1), expressed in terms of creators:
Ψ = U1U2 · · ·Um. (4.3)
If the only observables are the numbers (4.2), no observ-
able quantity depends on the order in which the subsys-
tems are multiplied. Any permutation
Ψpi = Upi(1)Upi(2) · · ·Upi(m) (4.4)
yields the same observables, where pi denotes one of the
m! permutations of the integers (1, 2, . . . ,m). The value
of the product does, however, depend on this order, as
indicated by the subscript on Ψpi.
According to the results of Sec. III F, all but one of
the subsystems Uk are taken to be quasiclassical. For
definiteness, let U1 be the one subsystem that need not be
quasiclassical. In the permutation (4.4), U1 is at position
k = kv, where
pi(kv) = 1, kv = pi
−1(1). (4.5)
We can then solve Eq. (4.4) for U1, obtaining
V ≡ U1 = U−1pi(kv−1) · · ·U
−1
pi(1)ΨpiU
−1
pi(m) · · ·U−1pi(kv+1). (4.6)
As noted here, the symbol V or |v〉 = V |0〉 will often be
used to refer to this non-quasiclassical subsystem.
D. Subsystem differences
The next topic is how to describe small differences be-
tween two subsystem decompositions. Consider two sets
of subsystems, {Uk} and {U ′k}, whose products are Ψ
and Ψ′, respectively. The quasiclassical subsystems can
be given an exponential representation (3.16), for which
the difference ∆Xk ≡ X ′k − Xk is assumed to be small.
The corresponding difference ∆Uk ≡ U ′k − Uk is then
given (for k 6= 1) by Eq. (3.19):
∆Uk = exp(Xk + ∆Xk)− expXk
= {∆Xk, Uk}, (4.7)
in which terms beyond the first order in ∆Xk have been
neglected. Likewise, the first-order difference between
(U ′k)
−1 and U−1k is (for k 6= 1)
∆U−1k = exp(−Xk −∆Xk)− exp(−Xk)
= −{∆Xk, U−1k }. (4.8)
The difference ∆V = V ′ − V = U ′1 − U1 is taken to be
determined by the values of {∆U−1k } and ∆Ψ = Ψ′ −Ψ.
To define ∆V , it is helpful to introduce linear functionals
VX and V˜k[Y ] such that when X = Ψ and Y = U
−1
k we
have
VΨ = V = V˜k[U
−1
k ] (k 6= 1). (4.9)
To first order in small quantities, ∆V is then given by
∆V = V∆Ψ +
m∑
k=2
V˜k[∆U
−1
k ]. (4.10)
Note that ∆V depends (implicitly) on the choice of per-
mutation pi in Eq. (4.4).
For practical calculations, the exponents |xk〉 = Xk|0〉
are usually expanded in some orthonormal basis {|eki〉}:
|xk〉 =
∑
i
cki|eki〉 (k 6= 1), (4.11)
in which cki = 〈eki|xk〉. The corresponding change |∆xk〉
is thus
|∆xk〉 =
∑
i
∆cki|eki〉, ∆cki = 〈eki|∆xk〉. (4.12)
Combining this expression with Eq. (4.7) then gives
|∆uk〉 =
∑
i
∆cki|fki〉, (4.13)
in which the creator of |fki〉 is defined to be
fki = {eki, Uk}. (4.14)
For a given value of k, the set {|fki〉} is generally not
orthonormal, but it is linearly independent if and only
if the set {|eki〉} is. [This can be shown easily using Eq.
(F3).] From Eq. (4.13), we now see that |∆uk〉 and |∆xk〉
are related by
|∆uk〉 =
(∑
i
|fki〉〈eki|
)
|∆xk〉. (4.15)
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A similar expression for |∆v〉 = ∆V |0〉 can be derived
from Eq. (4.10):
|∆v〉 = |v∆Ψ〉+
m∑
k=2
∑
i
∆cki|gki〉 (4.16a)
= |v∆Ψ〉+
m∑
k=2
(∑
i
|gki〉〈eki|
)
|∆xk〉, (4.16b)
in which the creators of |gki〉 are defined as
gki = −V˜k[{eki, U−1k }]. (4.17)
E. Subsystem geometry
The preceding expressions for subsystem differences
are useful primarily in the context of geometric structures
that allow us to measure the distance between neighbor-
ing subsystem decompositions. Such a metric is essential
for both the definition of the time functional in Sec. V
and the variational formulation of dynamical stability in
Sec. VI.
There are many ways to define such a distance, but
the most suitable measure for the present purposes is the
Hilbert–Schmidt distance [139]. This distance is based
on the Hilbert–Schmidt inner product and norm
(A,B) =
1
2
tr(A†B), ‖A‖ =
√
(A,A), (4.18)
in which A and B are operators. The Hilbert–Schmidt
distance D is then defined as
D(A,B) = ‖A−B‖. (4.19)
The operators of interest are the subsystem projectors
ρk =
|uk〉〈uk|
〈uk|uk〉 , ρ
′
k =
|u′k〉〈u′k|
〈u′k|u′k〉
. (4.20)
The square of the Hilbert–Schmidt distance between the
subsystem states |uk〉 and |u′k〉 is thus given by
D2(ρk, ρ
′
k) = 1− tr(ρkρ′k) (4.21a)
=
〈u′k|(1− ρk)|u′k〉
〈u′k|u′k〉
. (4.21b)
This satisfies 0 ≤ D2(ρk, ρ′k) ≤ 1, which is the reason for
introducing the factor of 1/2 in Eq. (4.18) [139].
Our primary interest is in the value of D2(ρk, ρ
′
k) for
small subsystem differences |∆uk〉 = |u′k〉 − |uk〉. Noting
that (1− ρk)|uk〉 = 0, we can rewrite Eq. (4.21) as
D2(ρk, ρ
′
k) =
〈∆uk|(1− ρk)|∆uk〉
〈u′k|u′k〉
, (4.22)
which shows that D2(ρk, ρ
′
k) is of order ‖∆uk‖2 ≡〈∆uk|∆uk〉. Indeed, since 〈u′k|u′k〉 = 〈uk|uk〉+O(‖∆uk‖),
we have
D2(ρk, ρ
′
k) =
〈∆uk|(1− ρk)|∆uk〉
〈uk|uk〉 +O(‖∆uk‖
3). (4.23)
The leading term in this expression is the familiar Fubini–
Study metric [139–145]. The Hilbert–Schmidt distance is
only one of several large-scale measures of distance that
lead to the Fubini–Study metric in the limit of infinites-
imal ‖∆uk‖ [139, 140], but it is generally the easiest of
these to work with.
The next step is to extend this measure of distance
to the subsystem decomposition (4.4) as a whole. The
simplest way to do this is to construct a direct sum of
the projectors ρk:
ρ ≡
m⊕
k=1
ρk = ρ1 ⊕ ρ2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ρm. (4.24)
The resulting operator ρ is also a projector, since ρ2k = ρk
implies ρ2 = ρ. The Hilbert–Schmidt distance (4.19)
between ρ and ρ′ is then
D2(ρ, ρ′) = m− tr(ρρ′) (4.25a)
=
m∑
k=1
D2(ρk, ρ
′
k), (4.25b)
which is clearly independent of the choice of permutation
pi in Eq. (4.4). In the limit of infinitesimal ‖∆uk‖, this
reduces to
D2(ρ, ρ′) =
m∑
k=1
〈∆uk|(1− ρk)|∆uk〉
〈uk|uk〉 , (4.26)
which is the Fubini–Study metric for the entire subsystem
decomposition.
This result can be expressed more concisely by using a
direct-sum representation of vectors. For arbitrary sub-
system kets |ϕk〉 and |χk〉, let their direct sum be denoted
by the same symbol without the subscript k:
|ϕ〉 ≡
m⊕
k=1
|ϕk〉, |χ〉 ≡
m⊕
k=1
|χk〉. (4.27)
It is convenient also to bury the normalization factor
〈uk|uk〉 inside the definition of the inner product:
〈ϕ|χ〉 ≡
m∑
k=1
〈ϕk|χk〉
〈uk|uk〉 . (4.28)
This allows Eq. (4.26) to be written simply as
η ≡ D2(ρ, ρ′) = 〈∆u|(1− ρ)|∆u〉, (4.29)
in which the letter η is introduced as a concise symbol
for this functional of ρ and |∆u〉.
V. TIME AS A FUNCTIONAL
With this measure of distance in hand, we can now
turn to the topic of subsystem dynamics, beginning with
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the concept of time. This section starts by explaining
why, in a system of interacting particles, it is impossi-
ble for both |ψ〉 and the subsystems |uk〉 to satisfy the
Schro¨dinger equation. Next, it is argued that in a closed
system, the external time parameter t of conventional
quantum mechanics is meaningless. Instead, time should
be defined internally via the relations between changes in
subsystems. This is then used to construct a time func-
tional, which will be applied to calculations of subsystem
dynamics in Sec. VI.
A. Why interacting subsystems cannot satisfy the
Schro¨dinger equation
Let us start by examining whether it is possible
for a closed system and its subsystems to satisfy the
Schro¨dinger equation. It is sufficient for this purpose to
study a two-subsystem decomposition |ψ〉 = |u〉  |v〉 =
U |v〉. The Schro¨dinger equation for the total system is
i∂t|ψ〉 = H|ψ〉 = HU |v〉, (5.1)
in which H is the Hamiltonian. But this is the same as
i∂t|ψ〉 = [H,U ]|v〉+ UH|v〉 (5.2a)
= [H,U ]|v〉+ |u〉  (H|v〉). (5.2b)
If the operator [H,U ] is a creator, then [H,U ]|v〉 =
([H,U ]|0〉) |v〉, in which
[H,U ]|0〉 = HU |0〉 − UH|0〉 = (H − E0)|u〉, (5.3)
where E0 is the energy of the vacuum. Assuming that
E0 = 0 (which is necessary if |0〉 is to act as a time-
independent multiplicative identity), Eq. (5.2b) can thus
be written as
i∂t|ψ〉 = (H|u〉) |v〉+ |u〉  (H|v〉). (5.4)
A comparison with the differential identity
∂t|ψ〉 = (∂t|u〉) |v〉+ |u〉  (∂t|v〉) (5.5)
then shows that both |u〉 and |v〉 can satisfy the
Schro¨dinger equation.
But when is it true that [H,U ] is a creator? If H
conserves particle number, it can be written as a polyno-
mial (usually quadratic) function of the hopping opera-
tors a†iaj (which reduce to number operators Ni = a
†
iai
when i = j). Now the commutator of a hopping operator
and a creation operator is just another creation operator:
[a†iaj , a
†
k] = δjka
†
i . (5.6)
Assuming that H is linear in the hopping operators—
as would be the case for a system of noninteracting
particles—this shows that the commutator of H with a
creator always generates another creator. The subsys-
tems |u〉 and |v〉 can therefore satisfy the Schro¨dinger
equation in this case.
However, if pairs of particles interact, then H also in-
cludes the pair distribution operator [133]
Pij = NiNj − δijNi, (5.7)
for which
[Pij , a
†
k] = δika
†
kNj + δjka
†
kNi. (5.8)
This contains both creation and annihilation operators.
Hence, in a system of interacting particles, [H,U ] is not
a creator, and it is impossible in general for all of |ψ〉,
|u〉, and |v〉 to satisfy the Schro¨dinger equation.
B. Relational time in quantum mechanics
An extensive literature on the topic of relational
time in quantum mechanics also casts serious doubt on
whether the time parameter t in Eq. (5.1) can have any
meaning in a closed system (see, e.g., Refs. [35–51]). The
argument is very similar to that already given in Sec.
IV B. Namely, within a closed system, one can observe
only changes in the relations between various subsystems;
one does not have access to any hypothetical absolute ex-
ternal time variable.
Page and Wootters [36, 37, 41] have argued that this
gives rise to an effective energy superselection rule in
which a coherent superposition of different energy eigen-
states is experimentally indistinguishable from a statis-
tical mixture. Page [41], Poulin [47], and Milburn and
Poulin [48] have extended this approach by using group
averaging of density operators to eliminate the external
time parameter t, thereby reducing a general unmixed
state to a statistical mixture of energy eigenstates.
A common strategy in this type of approach is to iden-
tify one subsystem as a clock and measure time via cor-
relations between the clock subsystem and other subsys-
tems. This gives rise to an effective decoherence mecha-
nism if the clock is of finite size [44, 45, 47, 48, 74].
Barbour [42] has argued that such approaches do not
agree with how time is defined operationally. In prac-
tice, we define time not by looking at a single clock, but
by using the time parameter t to achieve the best fit to
all of the experimental information at our disposal. This
ephemeris time concept was developed long ago by as-
tronomers, but even today it is how time is defined from
a network of atomic clocks, all of which operate in dif-
ferent environments and run at slightly different rates.
From this perspective, “ultimately the universe is the
only clock” [42].
Time is defined in the present paper by using the con-
cept of ephemeris time in the context of the geometric
approach to quantum mechanics developed by Anandan
and Aharonov [144, 145]. These authors have alluded
to this concept themselves, even going so far as to say
that “The parameter t represents correlation between the
Fubini–Study distances determined by different clocks”
[144].
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However, the correlation between different clocks is
found only in these words, not in any of their equations.
Their equations establish only a relationship between ex-
ternal time and the Fubini–Study distance traveled by
a system evolving according to Schro¨dinger’s equation
[144, 145]. During a “measurement,” however, the sys-
tem can move a finite distance in the projective Hilbert
space during a time interval of zero [146]. It is not clear
how these disparate Hilbert-space transport mechanisms
are to be reconciled. But this is of course just the old
conundrum posed by von Neumann’s axioms of time evo-
lution [55].
This paper implements Anandan and Aharonov’s idea
mathematically by introducing a time functional that is
optimized to achieve the best fit between Schro¨dinger dy-
namics and the changes that occur in all subsystems. The
actual value of these changes is not determined by this
functional; that task is left to the principle of dynamical
stability, to be discussed below in Sec. VI.
C. Definition of the time functional
The time functional can be defined using a simple ex-
tension of the geometric concepts introduced previously
in Sec. IV E. Consider two slightly different subsystem
decompositions, ρ and ρ′. If ρ′ differs from ρ only by a
Schro¨dinger time evolution, the two decompositions must
be related by
ρ′ ?= e−iHˆ∆τρeiHˆ∆τ (5.9)
for some time interval ∆τ , in which
Hˆ ≡
m⊕
k=1
H (5.10)
is the Hamiltonian in the direct-sum formalism. Of
course, for arbitrary ρ and ρ′, Eq. (5.9) will not be true,
but we can try to get as close as possible to such a de-
scription by minimizing the Hilbert–Schmidt distance be-
tween the two sides of the equation. In other words, we
can define a function
λ(∆τ) ≡ D2(e−iHˆ∆τρeiHˆ∆τ , ρ′) (5.11a)
= D2(ρ, eiHˆ∆τρ′e−iHˆ∆τ ) (5.11b)
and seek the value of ∆τ that minimizes this function.
This special value, denoted ∆τ = ∆t, provides the best
fit between ρ and ρ′ that can be expressed in the language
of Schro¨dinger dynamics.
Our only concern is the case of infinitesimal differences
‖∆uk‖, for which ∆t is also infinitesimal. We can there-
fore use the Fubini–Study metric of Eqs. (4.26) and (4.29)
to write
λ(∆τ) = 〈u′|e−iHˆ∆τ (1− ρ)eiHˆ∆τ |u′〉 (5.12a)
=
m∑
k=1
〈u′k|e−iH∆τ (1− ρk)eiH∆τ |u′k〉
〈uk|uk〉 . (5.12b)
Here the exponentials can be expanded in the usual way:
e−iHˆ∆τ (1− ρ)eiHˆ∆τ = (1− ρ)− i∆τ [Hˆ, 1− ρ]
− 12∆τ2[Hˆ, [Hˆ, 1− ρ]] + · · · . (5.13)
If we treat ∆τ and ‖∆u‖ as of the same order and work
to second order overall, the final result can be written as
λ(∆τ) = η − 2∆τ Im〈∆u|H〉+ ∆τ2〈H|H〉, (5.14)
in which λ(0) = η was already defined in Eq. (4.29). The
vector |H〉 in this expression is defined as
|H〉 ≡ (1− ρ)Hˆ|u〉 (5.15a)
=
m⊕
k=1
(1− ρk)H|uk〉. (5.15b)
The minimum of the quadratic function (5.14) occurs at
∆τ = ∆t, in which
∆t =
Im〈∆u|H〉
〈H|H〉 . (5.16)
This is the desired expression giving the optimal time
interval ∆t as a functional of the subsystem change |∆u〉.
D. Properties of the time functional
Note that the solution (5.16) can be used to rewrite
Eq. (5.14) as
λ(∆τ) = η + ∆τ(∆τ − 2∆t)〈H|H〉. (5.17)
When ∆τ = ∆t, this function attains its minimum value
λ(∆t) = η −∆t2〈H|H〉 (5.18a)
= η − (Im〈∆u|H〉)
2
〈H|H〉 . (5.18b)
Given the definition (5.11) of λ(∆τ) as the square of a
distance, it seems obvious that this minimum value must
satisfy λ(∆t) ≥ 0. However, it is not immediately clear
from Eq. (5.18) that this is in fact the case.
To see explicitly that λ(∆t) is indeed nonnegative, note
that
(Im〈∆u|H〉)2 ≤ |〈∆u|H〉|2. (5.19)
This inequality in conjunction with Eq. (5.18b) implies
that
λ(∆t) ≥ η − |〈∆u|H〉|
2
〈H|H〉 (5.20a)
= 〈∆u|(1− ρ−ΠH)|∆u〉, (5.20b)
in which ΠH is the projector
ΠH ≡ |H〉〈H|〈H|H〉 . (5.21)
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Because ρ and ΠH are orthogonal, the operator (1− ρ−
ΠH) is also a projector. This can be used to write
〈∆u|(1− ρ−ΠH)|∆u〉 = 〈w|w〉 ≥ 0, (5.22)
in which
|w〉 ≡ (1− ρ−ΠH)|∆u〉. (5.23)
This proves that λ(∆t) ≥ 0, and furthermore that a nec-
essary condition for λ(∆t) = 0 is |w〉 = 0 or
(1− ρ)|∆u〉 = ΠH |∆u〉. (5.24)
However, this condition is not sufficient. Tracing back to
the previous inequality (5.19), we see that Re〈∆u|H〉 = 0
is also required. Hence, in order to achieve λ(∆t) = 0, it
is necessary and sufficient that
(1− ρ)|∆u〉 = iC|H〉, (5.25)
in which C is a real constant. In other words, the com-
ponent of |∆u〉 that is orthogonal to |u〉 must be propor-
tional to |H〉, with an imaginary coefficient.
What is the significance of this? According to the def-
inition (5.15), the vector |H〉 is just the component of
Hˆ|u〉 that is orthogonal to |u〉. Hence, the condition
(5.25) says that in order to achieve λ(∆t) = 0, all sub-
systems must satisfy the Schro¨dinger equation, but only
insofar as the component of |∆u〉 orthogonal to |u〉 is
concerned. [The component of |∆u〉 that is parallel to
|u〉 does not contribute to the distance (4.29).]
Another way of expressing |H〉 is
|H〉 =
m⊕
k=1
(H − 〈H〉k)|uk〉, (5.26)
in which 〈H〉k is the mean value [cf. Eq. (4.2)]
〈H〉k ≡ 〈uk|H|uk〉〈uk|uk〉 . (5.27)
Hence, the inner product 〈H|H〉 can be written as
〈H|H〉 =
m∑
k=1
〈uk|(H − 〈H〉k)2|uk〉
〈uk|uk〉 . (5.28)
This provides a simple physical interpretation of 〈H|H〉:
it is the combined energy variance of all subsystems.
The corresponding standard deviation is denoted ∆E ≡√〈H|H〉.
The inequality λ(∆t) ≥ 0 can thus be written in the
alternative form [cf. Eq. (5.18a)]
∆E2∆t2 ≤ η. (5.29)
This looks vaguely like a time–energy uncertainty rela-
tion, except that the inequality is pointing in the wrong
direction—so actually it is nothing of the kind. It sim-
ply says that, for a given squared distance η = D2(ρ, ρ′),
there is an upper bound on the optimal value of ∆τ that
can be fitted to ρ and ρ′ using Eq. (5.9). Furthermore,
because the optimal value ∆τ = ∆t is intimately related
to Schro¨dinger dynamics, the numerical value of ∆t de-
pends on the energy scale ∆E determined by the subsys-
tem decomposition ρ.
To conclude this section, we may note that the time
functional (5.16) offers a very simple way of implement-
ing the idea that “ultimately the universe is the only
clock.” But of course, as mentioned previously, the def-
inition of such a clock tells us nothing about how the
subsystems evolve in time. Finding a way to define this
time evolution is the subject of the next section.
VI. DYNAMICAL STABILITY OF
SUBSYSTEMS
The most obvious criterion for defining subsystem dy-
namics is to maximize the stability of the subsystem
decomposition. In other words, we should choose the
dynamics such that the decomposition “hops about the
least” [147]. This concept of dynamical stability has a
long history. In the early days of quantum mechanics,
Schro¨dinger used it in an attempt to interpret particles as
stable wave packets [134, 135]. More recently, its impor-
tance for decoherence theory has been repeatedly empha-
sized by Zeh [68, 148–155], and the basic idea has been
developed extensively by Zurek under such names as the
predictability sieve [156, 157], einselection [69, 158, 159],
the existential interpretation [156, 158, 159], and quan-
tum Darwinism [159, 160].
In this section, the concept of dynamical stability is
defined for the subsystem decomposition (4.4) in terms of
a dynamical stability functional χ. The time evolution of
the subsystems is then determined by maximizing χ. For
simplicity, the total system state |ψ〉 is initially assumed
to be independent of time. This analysis is then extended
to the case of time-dependent |ψ〉.
A. Dynamical stability functional
To simplify the description of dynamical stability, it is
convenient to introduce the dimensionless variable
σ ≡ ∆E∆t = Im〈∆u|H〉
∆E
. (6.1)
The dynamical stability functional χ is then defined as
χ ≡ σ
2
η
=
∆E2∆t2
D2(ρ, ρ′)
(η 6= 0). (6.2)
The foundation for this definition is the inequality (5.29),
which says that 0 ≤ χ ≤ 1. The principle of dynamical
stability is implemented by holding ρ fixed and varying
ρ′ so as to maximize the value of χ. The decompositions
ρ and ρ′ could thus be regarded as “initial” and “final,”
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although this has the potential to be misleading because
it has nothing to do with the sign of ∆t.
Maximizing χ with respect to variations in ρ′ simply
requires that the subsystems change as little as possi-
ble (as measured by the Fubini–Study metric) in a given
infinitesimal time interval ∆t. According to the results
of Sec. V A, if |ψ〉 is assumed to satisfy the Schro¨dinger
equation, the upper limit χ = 1 is generally unattainable
in a system of interacting particles.
Suppose now that ρ′ is varied by a small amount δρ.
(This should perhaps be written as δρ′, but the prime
symbol can be omitted because ρ itself is not varied.)
This will give rise to corresponding variations δσ, δη,
and δχ, which are related by
δχ =
(σ + δσ)2
η + δη
− σ
2
η
=
2σδσ − χδη + δσ2
η + δη
. (6.3)
To first order in small quantities, this reduces to
δχ = η−1(2σδσ − χδη), (6.4)
in which all variations are evaluated to first order in δρ.
The stationary states of the dynamical stability func-
tional are then given by δχ = 0 or
δη
η
= 2
δσ
σ
(σ 6= 0), (6.5)
in which σ 6= 0 can always be assumed because we have
no interest in the minima of χ.
B. Time-independent Ψ
Let us now apply the principle of dynamical stability
to the special case in which the total system state Ψ
is assumed to be independent of time, so that ∆Ψ ≡
Ψ′ − Ψ = 0. This implies that V∆Ψ = 0 in the general
expression (4.10) for ∆V ≡ ∆U1, which simplifies the
analysis considerably.
The quantities to be varied are the “final” subsystem
exponents |x′k〉 = X ′k|0〉 for the quasiclassical subsystems
(k 6= 1). As before, it is convenient to use a direct-sum
representation for the differences |∆xk〉 = |x′k〉 − |xk〉:
|∆x〉 =
m⊕
k=2
|∆xk〉. (6.6)
In contrast to the definition of |∆u〉 [see Eq. (4.27)], the
value k = 1 is not included in the definition of |∆x〉.
There are two reasons for this. First, as noted in Sec.
IV D, only the subsystems with k 6= 1 are treated as
independently variable; the subsystem k = 1 is entirely
determined by Ψ and the other subsystems. Second, it
is not generally even possible to define X1 = lnU1, since
Ψ need not be quasiclassical.
The dimensionless time interval (6.1) can now be ex-
pressed in terms of the independent variables |∆x〉 as
σ =
Im〈∆u|H〉
∆E
≡ Im〈∆x|σ〉, (6.7)
in which the components of the vector |σ〉 are given by
[cf. Eqs. (4.15), (4.16), (5.15)]
〈eki|σ〉 = 1
∆E
[ 〈fki|(1− ρk)H|uk〉
〈uk|uk〉
+
〈gki|(1− ρv)H|v〉
〈v|v〉
]
. (6.8)
In this expression, ρv ≡ ρ1 and |v〉 ≡ |u1〉. The squared
distance η can be written likewise as
η = 〈∆x|ηˆ|∆x〉, (6.9)
in which the matrix elements of the operator ηˆ are given
by [cf. Eq. (4.29)]
〈eki|ηˆ|ek′i′〉 = δkk′ 〈fki|(1− ρk)|fki
′〉
〈uk|uk〉
+
〈gki|(1− ρv)|gk′i′〉
〈v|v〉 . (6.10)
The operator ηˆ is clearly positive (ηˆ ≥ 0), and it can be
made positive definite (ηˆ > 0) if we agree to exclude the
vacuum state [161] from the orthonormal basis {|eki〉}
used to define the subsystem exponents in Eq. (4.11).
If we now vary |x′〉 by |δx〉 (holding |x〉 fixed), |∆x〉
also varies by |δx〉. The resulting first-order variations in
σ and η are
δσ = Im〈δx|σ〉 = 〈δx|σ〉 − 〈σ|δx〉
2i
, (6.11a)
δη = 〈δx|ηˆ|∆x〉+ 〈∆x|ηˆ|δx〉. (6.11b)
Substituting these expressions into the stationary-state
condition (6.5) gives
〈δx|ηˆ|∆x〉+ 〈∆x|ηˆ|δx〉 = −iC(〈δx|σ〉 − 〈σ|δx〉), (6.12)
in which C ≡ η/σ is real. Because the variation |δx〉 is
arbitrary, we can partition this equation in the usual way
[100, pp. 764–765] to obtain
〈δx|ηˆ|∆x〉 = −iC〈δx|σ〉, (6.13)
together with its complex conjugate. Removing the ar-
bitrary vector 〈δx| gives the linear algebraic equation
ηˆ|∆x〉 = −iC|σ〉, (6.14)
in which ηˆ is positive definite and therefore invertible. All
stationary states of the dynamical stability functional χ
with χ > 0 are thus given explicitly by
|∆x〉 = −iCηˆ−1|σ〉. (6.15)
Upon substituting this result back into the definitions
of σ, η, and χ, we find
σ = C〈σ|ηˆ−1|σ〉, (6.16a)
η = C2〈σ|ηˆ−1|σ〉, (6.16b)
χ = 〈σ|ηˆ−1|σ〉. (6.16c)
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The only degree of freedom in the solution (6.15) is the
value of the real constant C = η/σ = σ/χ. Since χ is in-
dependent of C, one can find the value of C from a given
time interval ∆t simply by calculating C = ∆E∆t/χ.
The sign of ∆t can be positive or negative, but its mag-
nitude should always be chosen small enough that η  1
(or else the approximations used in deriving the basic
equations are no longer valid).
Thus, for a given sign and magnitude of ∆t, there is
only one stationary state of the dynamical stability func-
tional with χ > 0. This strongly suggests that this sta-
tionary state is the unique global maximum of χ. A proof
of this conjecture is given in Appendix G.
The solution (6.15) can be viewed as a differential
equation for |x〉, since
∂|x〉
∂t
= lim
∆t→0
|∆x〉
∆t
= −i∆E ηˆ
−1|σ〉
〈σ|ηˆ−1|σ〉 , (6.17)
in which the limit ∆t → 0 is somewhat redundant be-
cause it has been assumed throughout the derivation.
This equation can be integrated to obtain |x〉 as a func-
tion of t; in practice, this is done by using Eq. (6.15)
repeatedly for small but finite intervals ∆t. Numerical
calculations on simple models (see Sec. VI F) show that
the change in |x〉 over a fixed time interval T does indeed
converge (quadratically) to a definite value in the limit
∆t→ 0.
The time evolution generated by Eq. (6.17) is deter-
ministic. That is, the final subsystem decomposition is
uniquely determined by the initial one, and if the subsys-
tems are propagated forward and backward over a finite
interval (by changing the sign of ∆t at the far end), the
returning solution always converges to its initial value.
Hence, even though the differential equation (6.17) is
nonlinear, it does not exhibit any of the lack of determin-
ism so characteristic of standard quantum mechanics.
C. Time-dependent Ψ
The next step is to lift the restriction ∆Ψ = 0 that was
imposed in Sec. VI B. Because the total system is closed,
|∆ψ〉 is assumed to follow the Schro¨dinger equation (to
first order in the time functional ∆t):
|∆ψ〉 = −i∆tH|ψ〉 = −i∆tHΨ|0〉. (6.18)
This does not imply that ∆Ψ = −i∆tHΨ, because HΨ
is not a creator. Rather, we have
∆Ψ = −i∆t(H ·Ψ), (6.19)
in which H ·Ψ denotes the creator defined by (H ·Ψ)|0〉 ≡
H|ψ〉. Upon substituting this result into Eq. (4.16), we
obtain
|∆v〉 = −i∆t|vH·Ψ〉+
m∑
k=2
(∑
i
|gki〉〈eki|
)
|∆xk〉. (6.20)
The dimensionless interval σ then takes the form
σ = ∆E∆t =
Im〈∆u|H〉
∆E
= Im〈∆x|σ0〉+ ∆t
∆E
Re
[ 〈vH·Ψ|(1− ρv)H|v〉
〈v|v〉
]
, (6.21)
in which |σ0〉 relabels the vector introduced previously in
Eq. (6.8). Noting that ∆t now appears on both sides of
the equation, we can combine these terms to obtain
ω∆E∆t = Im〈∆x|σ0〉, (6.22)
in which ω is the real constant
ω ≡ 1− 1
∆E2
Re
[ 〈vH·Ψ|(1− ρv)H|v〉
〈v|v〉
]
. (6.23)
At this point it is convenient to redefine the vector |σ〉 so
as to obtain the same outward appearance as Eq. (6.7):
σ = ∆E∆t =
Im〈∆x|σ0〉
ω
≡ Im〈∆x|σ〉, (6.24)
in which |σ〉 is just a renormalized version of Eq. (6.8):
〈eki|σ〉 = 1
ω∆E
[ 〈fki|(1− ρk)H|uk〉
〈uk|uk〉
+
〈gki|(1− ρv)H|v〉
〈v|v〉
]
. (6.25)
Hence, the time evolution of Ψ affects the variable σ only
through the renormalization factor ω.
However, its effect on η is more profound. Because
|∆v〉 is now linear in ∆t, η in Eq. (4.29) becomes a
quadratic function of ∆t. When expressed in terms of
σ, this quadratic dependence takes the form
η(∆t) = η0 + 2βσ + κσ
2, (6.26)
in which η(∆t) = D2(ρ, ρ′) = 〈∆u|(1−ρ)|∆u〉 is the func-
tion defined in Eq. (4.29) and η0 ≡ η(0) = 〈∆x|ηˆ|∆x〉 re-
labels the quantity defined earlier in Eq. (6.9). Although
η now depends on ∆t, one should note carefully that
η(∆t) 6= λ(∆t) [see Eq. (5.18)].
The new functional β in Eq. (6.26) is defined by
β = Im〈∆x|β〉, (6.27)
in which |β〉 is the vector
〈eki|β〉 = 1
∆E
〈gki|(1− ρv)|vH·Ψ〉
〈v|v〉 . (6.28)
The dimensionless constant κ in Eq. (6.26) is defined by
κ =
1
∆E2
〈vH·Ψ|(1− ρv)|vH·Ψ〉
〈v|v〉 . (6.29)
With these results, we can now construct the dynamical
stability functional χ = σ2/η just as before, in which
η ≡ η(∆t).
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D. Real matrix representation
There are several ways to solve the variation problem
for χ. The method used here has the advantage of requir-
ing very little modification when the definition of distance
is changed below in Sec. VII.
When η in Eq. (6.26) is expressed as a function of the
expansion coefficients ∆cki = 〈eki|∆x〉 introduced in Eq.
(4.12), the result can be written as
η = µ+ ν, (6.30)
in which µ has the same form as η0 = 〈∆x|ηˆ|∆x〉:
µ =
∑
ki
∑
k′i′
∆c∗ki∆ck′i′µki,k′i′ . (6.31)
However, ν is qualitatively different:
ν = Re
(∑
ki
∑
k′i′
∆c∗ki∆c
∗
k′i′νki,k′i′
)
. (6.32)
Here the matrix elements µki,k′i′ and νki,k′i′ are given by
µki,k′i′ = δkk′
〈fki|(1− ρk)|fki′〉
〈uk|uk〉 +
〈gki|(1− ρv)|gk′i′〉
〈v|v〉
+
1
2
(βkiσ
∗
k′i′ + σkiβ
∗
k′i′ + κσkiσ
∗
k′i′) (6.33)
and
νki,k′i′ = −1
2
(βkiσk′i′ + σkiβk′i′ + κσkiσk′i′), (6.34)
in which βki = 〈eki|β〉 and σki = 〈eki|σ〉. Because ν, un-
like µ and η0, is not a sesquilinear form, the stationary-
state equation (6.5) no longer reduces to a linear alge-
braic equation for the complex coefficients ∆cki.
However, one can put Eq. (6.5) into the form of a linear
algebraic equation simply by separating
∆cki = ∆c
′
ki + i∆c
′′
ki, (6.35)
and working with the real variables ∆c′ki and ∆c
′′
ki. If
the real and imaginary parts of µki,k′i′ and νki,k′i′ are
likewise separated, η can be expressed in block matrix
notation as
η =
(
∆c′ ∆c′′
)( µ′ + ν′ −µ′′ + ν′′
µ′′ + ν′′ µ′ − ν′
)(
∆c′
∆c′′
)
, (6.36)
in which all matrix elements are real.
It is convenient to write this equation in a quasi-Dirac
notation:
η = (∆x|η˜|∆x), (6.37)
in which the rounded ket vector is represented by the real
column matrix
|∆x) =
(
∆c′
∆c′′
)
, (6.38)
and the operator η˜ is represented by the real symmetric
matrix
η˜ =
(
µ′ + ν′ −µ′′ + ν′′
µ′′ + ν′′ µ′ − ν′
)
. (6.39)
This matrix is symmetric because µ′, ν′, and ν′′ are sym-
metric, whereas µ′′ is antisymmetric.
A similar representation can be introduced for the di-
mensionless time interval
σ = Im〈∆x|σ〉 = Im
(∑
ki
∆c∗kiσki
)
, (6.40)
if we separate σki = σ
′
ki + iσ
′′
ki just as for ∆cki. This is
written in quasi-Dirac notation as
σ = (∆x|σ) = (σ|∆x), (6.41)
in which the matrix representation for |σ) is
|σ) =
(
σ′′
−σ′
)
. (6.42)
E. Dynamically stable subsystem changes
The dynamical stability functional χ now has a form
very similar to that found in Sec. VI B:
χ =
σ2
η
=
(∆x|σ)2
(∆x|η˜|∆x) . (6.43)
When |∆x) is varied by |δx), the stationary states are
determined by δχ = 0 or [cf. Eq. (6.13)]
(δx|η˜|∆x) = C(δx|σ), (6.44)
in which C ≡ σ/χ = η/σ. Because |δx) can range over
the whole vector space, this is equivalent to
η˜|∆x) = C|σ), (6.45)
which can be solved as before to obtain the dynamically
stable subsystem change
|∆x) = Cη˜−1|σ). (6.46)
Note that the factor of −i in Eq. (6.15) is absent here
because it is embedded into the definition (6.42) of |σ).
The qualitative properties of this solution are again
very similar to the solution (6.15) found in Sec. VI B.
In particular, the time evolution generated by Eq. (6.46)
remains deterministic.
If Ψ happens to be an energy eigenstate with energy
E, we have H ·Ψ = EΨ and thus
|vH·Ψ〉 = E|vΨ〉 = E|v〉. (6.47)
In this case
(1− ρv)|vH·Ψ〉 = E(1− ρv)|v〉 = 0, (6.48)
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which implies that ω = 1, |β〉 = 0, and κ = 0. Conse-
quently σ and η are exactly the same as when ∆Ψ = 0,
and there is no difference between the present results and
those of Sec. VI B. This is reassuring because it is pre-
cisely what we would expect when time evolution does
not change the ray that |ψ〉 belongs to.
F. Model calculations and special cases
As a tool for developing insight, it is helpful to run
some numerical calculations on simple models and see
how well the general principles of the theory hold up in
practice. The model used here was the extended Hub-
bard model [162] for small one-dimensional lattices of
interacting fermions. Tests were run on both spinless
fermions (with nearest-neighbor interactions) and spin
1/2 fermions (with on-site and nearest-neighbor interac-
tions). For fermions, the algebra of the ψ product can
easily be implemented using bitwise operations in the bi-
nary representation of Eq. (2.26).
As noted already at the end of Sec. VI B, convergence
tests of evolution over finite time intervals show that the
subsystem dynamics is indeed deterministic, with the so-
lutions converging quadratically in ∆t. This remains true
for the case of time-dependent Ψ.
An interesting test case is obtained by setting all terms
derived from |v〉 equal to zero in Eqs. (6.10), (6.23),
(6.25), (6.28), (6.29), (6.33), and (6.34). This elimi-
nates all constraints on ∆Ψ, thereby converting the con-
strained variation problem to an unconstrained variation.
With no constraints on the quasiclassical subsystems, one
would expect the solutions of Eq. (6.46) to have the ab-
solute maximum value of χ = 1, corresponding to the
limiting case of Schro¨dinger dynamics for all subsystems
[cf. Eq. (5.25)]. This is precisely what happens.
A similar result is obtained if one keeps all terms de-
rived from |v〉 but sets the particle interaction potential
to zero. This again yields χ = 1 and Schro¨dinger dy-
namics for all subsystems. As noted by Wiseman [163],
such a limit is physically uninteresting because it turns
each particle into an isolated universe having no connec-
tion with anything else. However, it is a crucial test for
the logical coherence of the theory, in that it establishes
the consistency of assuming Schro¨dinger dynamics for the
state |ψ〉 of a closed system.
G. The number of subsystems is dynamically
essential
The number of subsystems m has so far been treated
as an arbitrary parameter. But what is the significance of
this number? Does it play an active part in determining
the subsystem dynamics, or is its role more passive?
This question addresses the distinction between trivial
and nontrivial subsystems. A trivial subsystem is one
that remains in a pure vacuum state (|uk〉 = |0〉) as time
evolves. A trivial subsystem has no observable properties
(see Sec. IV A), so it makes no difference whether it is in-
cluded in the subsystem decomposition. The value of χ is
also unchanged by the addition of trivial subsystems. If
trivial subsystems are allowed by the principle of dynam-
ical stability, then the number m plays no essential role
in the dynamics, because one can add trivial subsystems
to any given subsystem decomposition without changing
any observable property.
However, vacuum subsystems are not dynamically sta-
ble in systems of interacting particles. All quasiclassical
subsystems, including vacuum subsystems, are coupled
to each other by the terms derived from |v〉 in the matrix
(6.10). A vacuum subsystem satisfies the time-dependent
Schro¨dinger equation, and we know already from Secs.
V A and VI A that such a time dependence is not dynam-
ically stable in a system of interacting particles. Because
χ < 1 (see Sec. VI A), there is always room to increase
χ by allowing an initial vacuum subsystem to evolve into
a nonvacuum final subsystem. Hence, in a system of in-
teracting particles, the number m plays an essential role
in the subsystem dynamics, because there are no trivial
subsystems.
On the other hand, for noninteracting particles, dy-
namically stable subsystem decompositions always have
χ = 1. The most general such decomposition can be
obtained by choosing an independent solution of the
Schro¨dinger equation for each subsystem. Because the
vacuum state satisfies the Schro¨dinger equation, trivial
subsystems are dynamically stable. Hence, for noninter-
acting particles, the number m need not be the same as
the number of nontrivial subsystems. (However, this case
is physically uninteresting, as noted in Sec. VI F.)
In conclusion, for the physically interesting case of in-
teracting particles, the number of subsystems m is an
essential determining factor for the subsystem dynam-
ics. The value of m is arbitrary, but some number must
be chosen in order to apply the principle of dynamical
stability.
VII. REFERENCE FRAMES AND
SUPERSELECTION RULES
Thus far, we have seen no sign of any deviation from
strict determinism in the subsystem dynamics. This re-
sult seems to be in tension with the lack of determinism
exhibited by ordinary quantum mechanics. However, up
to this point it has also been assumed that there are
in principle no restrictions on observable quantities. It
is therefore of interest to consider the effect of restric-
tions arising from the lack of an external reference frame,
which were discussed briefly in Sec. IV B. In standard
quantum mechanics, it is well known that the lack of a
reference frame generally gives rise to a superselection
rule [74] together with associated classical variables.
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A. Lack of phase reference
Rather than discussing reference frames in general, this
paper focuses on a particular example relevant to nonrel-
ativistic fermions, namely the number superselection rule
arising from the lack of a phase reference [74]. Lack of
a phase reference simply means that the phase transfor-
mation
|ψ〉 → eiNφ|ψ〉 (7.1)
has no observable consequences, where N is the operator
for the total number of particles and φ is any real number.
If particle number is conserved ([H,N ] = 0), then this
symmetry is maintained over time, since
e−iHt|ψ〉 = e−iNφe−iHteiNφ|ψ〉. (7.2)
Of course, in the present theory, observables are associ-
ated with the subsystems rather than |ψ〉 (Sec. IV A). To
see the effect on the subsystems, note that the transfor-
mation (7.1) is equivalent to
Ψ→ eiNφΨe−iNφ, (7.3)
because N |0〉 = 0. But this is equivalent to applying the
same phase transformation to every subsystem:
Uk → eiNφUke−iNφ (k = 1, 2, . . . ,m). (7.4)
A crucial difference between this phase shift and the
Schro¨dinger dynamics problem studied in Sec. V A is that
both sides of the mapping (7.4) are creators [see Eq.
(5.6)]. Hence, a phase shift applied to the total state
Ψ propagates directly to all of the subsystems. This is
analogous to Lubkin’s description of superselection rules
in standard quantum mechanics [67].
B. Equivalence classes of subsystem
decompositions
In the direct-sum formalism, applying the phase shift
|uk〉 → eiNφ|uk〉 to all subsystems k is the same as ap-
plying the phase shift |u〉 → eiNˆφ|u〉 to the direct sum of
subsystems, in which [cf. Eq. (5.10)]
Nˆ ≡
m⊕
k=1
N. (7.5)
If this phase shift has no observable consequences, the
relevant mathematical object is not the individual sub-
system decomposition |u〉 but rather the equivalence class
[u] ≡ {exp(iNˆφ)|u〉 : 0 ≤ φ < 2pi}. (7.6)
The corresponding equivalence class for a subsystem pro-
jector ρ is
[ρ] ≡ {exp(iNˆφ)ρ exp(−iNˆφ) : 0 ≤ φ < 2pi}. (7.7)
Such equivalence classes are also referred to as phase or-
bits [164]. In a system without a phase reference, all of
the preceding theory must be reformulated in terms of
orbits rather than individual subsystem decompositions.
C. Distance between phase orbits
The first step is to define a suitable measure of dis-
tance between phase orbits. The distance between [ρ]
and [ρ′] can be defined simply as the minimum distance
[165] between any two elements of these orbits:
D2([ρ], [ρ′]) ≡ min
θ,φ
D2(eiNˆθρe−iNˆθ, eiNˆφρ′e−iNˆφ). (7.8)
One of these phase shifts is redundant, so we can write
this definition more simply as
D2([ρ], [ρ′]) = min
φ
λ(φ), (7.9)
in which
λ(φ) = D2(ρ, eiNˆφρ′e−iNˆφ). (7.10)
Here it is worthwhile to pause and note the similarity
between λ(φ) and the function λ(∆τ) introduced previ-
ously in Eq. (5.11). This similarity means that much of
the following derivation will be almost identical to that
given in Sec. V C. Consequently, only a brief outline of
the results is presented.
For small changes ‖∆u‖, Eq. (7.10) reduces to
λ(φ) = 〈u′|e−iNˆφ(1− ρ)eiNˆφ|u′〉. (7.11)
After expanding the right-hand side to second order in
small quantities, we obtain the quadratic function
λ(φ) = η0 − 2φ Im〈∆u|N〉+ φ2〈N |N〉, (7.12)
in which η0 = λ(0) and |N〉 ≡ (1− ρ)Nˆ |u〉. The function
(7.12) has a minimum at φ = ϕ, in which
ϕ =
〈∆u|N〉
〈N |N〉 . (7.13)
The value of λ(φ) at the minimum is
λ(ϕ) = η0 − (Im〈∆u|N〉)
2
〈N |N〉 . (7.14)
But this minimum value is just the desired distance (7.9)
between the two orbits:
D2([ρ], [ρ′]) = 〈∆u|(1− ρ)|∆u〉 − (Im〈∆u|N〉)
2
〈N |N〉 . (7.15)
As before, the symbol η is used to refer to the square
of the basic measure of distance:
η ≡ D2([ρ], [ρ′]) = λ(ϕ). (7.16)
It is convenient to write this more concisely as
η = η0 − ξ2, (7.17)
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in which ξ is the functional
ξ ≡ Im〈∆u|N〉
∆N
= Im〈∆x|ξ〉, ∆N ≡
√
〈N |N〉, (7.18)
and |ξ〉 is the vector
〈eki|ξ〉 = 1
∆N
[ 〈fki|(1− ρk)N |uk〉
〈uk|uk〉
+
〈gki|(1− ρv)N |v〉
〈v|v〉
]
. (7.19)
Again, it is worth noting the close similarity between
these quantities and those defined in Secs. V and VI.
Sometimes it is necessary to calculate D2([ρ], [ρ′]) in
situations where ‖∆u‖ is not small. (See, for example,
the last paragraph in Sec. VII E.) This case is considered
in Appendix H.
D. Time functional for phase orbits
A time functional suitable for phase orbits can now
be derived by minimizing the function [cf. Eqs. (5.11),
(7.10)]
λ(φ,∆τ) ≡ D2(ρ, eiNˆφeiHˆ∆τρ′e−iHˆ∆τe−iNˆφ) (7.20)
with respect to both φ and ∆τ . Given that [H,N ] = 0,
this reduces in the case of small ‖∆u‖ to
λ(φ,∆τ) = 〈u′|e−iAˆ(1− ρ)eiAˆ|u′〉, (7.21)
in which the operator Aˆ is defined by
Aˆ(φ,∆τ) ≡ Hˆ∆τ + Nˆφ. (7.22)
When ‖∆u‖ is small, φ and ∆τ can also be treated as
small quantities of the same order, and Eq. (7.21) can be
expanded as usual to obtain the quadratic approximation
λ(φ,∆τ) = η0 − 2 Im〈∆u|A〉+ 〈A|A〉, (7.23)
in which η0 = λ(0, 0) and |A〉 = (1− ρ)Aˆ|u〉.
The minimum of this function occurs at (φ,∆τ) =
(ϕ,∆t), in which ϕ and ∆t satisfy the system of equa-
tions(〈N |N〉 〈N |H〉
〈H|N〉 〈H|H〉
)(
ϕ
∆t
)
=
(
Im〈∆u|N〉
Im〈∆u|H〉
)
. (7.24)
The matrix on the left is real and symmetric, because
[H,N ] = 0 implies 〈N |H〉 = 〈H|N〉. Upon inverting this
matrix, we find the desired time functional
∆t =
〈N |N〉 Im〈∆u|H〉 − 〈H|N〉 Im〈∆u|N〉
〈N |N〉〈H|H〉 − 〈N |H〉〈H|N〉 . (7.25)
This solution is well defined as long as 〈N |N〉 > 0,
〈H|H〉 > 0, and (by the Schwarz inequality) |H〉 6= c|N〉,
where c is any constant. If |H〉 = c|N〉, this simply means
that Schro¨dinger dynamics cannot move the subsystems
out of the initial phase orbit, so ∆t is ill defined (at least
to first order in small quantities).
Equation (7.25) looks considerably more complicated
than the previous functional (5.16), but it can be simpli-
fied by introducing the operator
K ≡ H − 〈H|N〉〈N |N〉N. (7.26)
Here K is just the component of H that is orthogonal to
N , in the sense that 〈K|N〉 = 0. In terms of K, the time
functional (7.25) is simply
∆t =
Im〈∆u|K〉
〈K|K〉 . (7.27)
The denominator satisfies 〈K|K〉 ≤ 〈H|H〉, equality oc-
curring if and only if 〈H|N〉 = 0. In geometric terms,
∆K ≡ √〈K|K〉 is the length of |K〉, which is the com-
ponent of |H〉 orthogonal to |N〉. Physically, ∆K is a
renormalized energy uncertainty, just what remains of
∆E after the unphysical part of H is removed (“unphys-
ical” because it has no observable consequences for this
particular |u〉).
The phase angle ϕ at the minimum of λ(φ,∆τ) can be
written likewise as
ϕ =
Im〈∆u|L〉
〈L|L〉 , L ≡ N −
〈N |H〉
〈H|H〉H. (7.28)
The value of λ(φ,∆τ) at the minimum is
λ(ϕ,∆t) = 〈∆u|(1− ρ)|∆u〉
− (Im〈∆u|N〉)
2
〈N |N〉 −
(Im〈∆u|K〉)2
〈K|K〉 , (7.29)
which is similar to Eqs. (5.18) and (7.14). This can also
be written as
λ(ϕ,∆t) = λ(ϕ, 0)−∆K2∆t2, (7.30)
in which λ(ϕ, 0) is the same as Eq. (7.14):
λ(ϕ, 0) = 〈∆u|(1− ρ)|∆u〉 − (Im〈∆u|N〉)
2
〈N |N〉 . (7.31)
If we follow the argument used in Sec. V D, it is easy to
prove that λ(ϕ,∆t) ≥ 0, in which a necessary condition
for equality is
(1− ρ)|∆u〉 = (ΠK + ΠN )|∆u〉, (7.32)
where ΠK and ΠN are the projectors for |K〉 and |N〉. A
necessary and sufficient condition for λ(ϕ,∆t) = 0 is
(1− ρ)|∆u〉 = iCK |K〉+ iCN |N〉, (7.33)
in which the numbers CK and CN are real.
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E. Dynamical stability of phase orbits
With the modified time functional (7.27) in hand,
we can now apply the principle of dynamical stability
in much the same way as before (see Sec. VI). Many
parts of the previous analysis can be carried over to the
case of phase orbits simply by replacing H → K and
∆E → ∆K. Thus, for example, the dimensionless time
interval σ is redefined as [cf. Eqs. (6.7), (6.24)]
σ ≡ ∆K∆t = Im〈∆u|K〉
∆K
= Im〈∆x|σ〉, (7.34)
in which the components of |σ〉 are [cf. Eq. (6.25)]
〈eki|σ〉 = 1
ω∆K
[ 〈fki|(1− ρk)K|uk〉
〈uk|uk〉
+
〈gki|(1− ρv)K|v〉
〈v|v〉
]
, (7.35)
and the renormalization factor ω is [cf. Eq. (6.23)]
ω = 1− 1
∆K2
Re
[ 〈vH·Ψ|(1− ρv)K|v〉
〈v|v〉
]
. (7.36)
Likewise, |β〉 and κ in Eqs. (6.28) and (6.29) are redefined
as
〈eki|β〉 = 1
∆K
〈gki|(1− ρv)|vH·Ψ〉
〈v|v〉 , (7.37)
κ =
1
∆K2
〈vH·Ψ|(1− ρv)|vH·Ψ〉
〈v|v〉 . (7.38)
The only truly new parameter to arise is
θ ≡ 1
∆N∆K
Re
[ 〈vH·Ψ|(1− ρv)N |v〉
〈v|v〉
]
. (7.39)
Given these definitions, the squared distance between
neighboring phase orbits is [cf. Eq. (6.26)]
η = η0 − ξ2 + 2σ(β − θξ) + σ2(κ− θ2), (7.40)
in which η0 = 〈∆x|ηˆ|∆x〉 and ξ is defined in Eq. (7.18).
Here it should be noted that Ψ is treated as time depen-
dent (see Sec. VI C) and η refers to the quantity
η = η(∆t) ≡ λ(ϕ, 0) 6= λ(ϕ,∆t), (7.41)
in which λ(ϕ, 0) is given in Eq. (7.31).
It is convenient now to follow the approach of Sec. VI D
and write η = µ+ν, in which µ and ν are defined in Eqs.
(6.31) and (6.32). The only difference is that the matrix
elements µki,k′i′ and νki,k′i′ in Eqs. (6.33) and (6.34) are
modified to become
µki,k′i′ = δkk′
〈fki|(1− ρk)|fki′〉
〈uk|uk〉 +
〈gki|(1− ρv)|gk′i′〉
〈v|v〉
+
1
2
[(βkiσ
∗
k′i′ + σkiβ
∗
k′i′) + (κ− θ2)σkiσ∗k′i′
− ξkiξ∗k′i′ − θ(ξkiσ∗k′i′ + σkiξ∗k′i′)], (7.42)
νki,k′i′ = −1
2
[(βkiσk′i′ + σkiβk′i′) + (κ− θ2)σkiσk′i′
− ξkiξk′i′ − θ(ξkiσk′i′ + σkiξk′i′)]. (7.43)
Aside from this change of definition, all of the subsequent
analysis in Secs. VI D and VI E follows through in the
same way as before. Because the solution (6.46) has the
same mathematical structure as before, it gives rise to the
same qualitative behavior too. That is, the dynamics of
phase orbits is also deterministic.
Of course, this does not mean that the subsystem dy-
namics is totally unchanged. The main difference arises
because ∆K is generally smaller than ∆E. The subsys-
tems therefore tend to evolve in time more slowly, be-
cause all physically unobservable changes (lying entirely
within a given orbit) have been filtered out.
Test calculations show that the phase-orbit dynamics
obtained by integrating Eq. (6.46) over a finite time in-
terval has the correct limiting behavior (i.e., Schro¨dinger
subsystem dynamics) for the special cases discussed in
Sec. VI F. To demonstrate this, one must use the phase-
orbit distance formulas derived in Appendix H for the
case of large ‖∆u‖.
VIII. SUBSYSTEM PERMUTATIONS
Thus far we have considered only one of the m! possible
permutations of the subsystems in Eq. (4.4). The next
step is to consider the set of all permutations.
A. Influence of permutations on dynamics
According to the definition of an observable in Sec.
IV A, a permutation of the subsystems merely rearranges
the labels k on the numbers 〈A〉k in Eq. (4.2). But the
subsystem labels k are not themselves observable, so a
permutation cannot affect the value of any observable
quantity at any given time.
On the other hand, permutation of the subsystems
does affect the value of the product Ψpi in Eq. (4.4).
This has no direct effect on any observable quantity, but
∆Ψpi = Ψ
′
pi − Ψpi determines the value of the subsystem
change ∆V [see Eq. (4.10)] generated by given changes
∆Uk in the quasiclassical subsystems (k 6= 1).
This means that subsystem permutations do alter the
subsystem dynamics. Starting from a given initial sub-
system decomposition ρ or phase orbit [ρ], a single time
step (6.46) will in general carry each permutation into
a different final state. In other words, the permutation
symmetry of observables is broken by the dynamics. Sub-
system permutations are thus qualitatively different from
the phase transformations considered in Sec. VII A.
But this suggests that it might be possible, at least in
principle, to use the effect of permutations on dynam-
ics to obtain information about subsystem permutations
from the time evolution of observables. Given unlim-
ited information about the observables of all subsystems
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(which is an unrealistic assumption, as will be discussed
in Sec. IX), one might even be able to deduce which in-
dividual permutation was consistent with a given set of
experimental data.
B. Subsystem ordering in orthodox quantum
mechanics
It is important to pause here and note that this effect
of subsystem permutations on dynamics is not limited
to the context of the present dynamical stability formal-
ism. It is a general consequence of the noncommutative
algebra of fermion creation operators that holds even in
orthodox quantum mechanics, although this aspect of the
theory has received little prior attention.
Consider, for example, the products Ψa = U1U2 and
Ψb = U2U1 of two creators U1 and U2. Since Ψa and Ψb
generally belong to different rays in projective Hilbert
space, they will of course evolve in different ways under
the Schro¨dinger equation. That is really all there is to it.
An obvious objection to this conclusion is that Ψa and
Ψb do not belong to different rays if U1 and U2 have
a definite number of fermions. In that case, Ψa differs
from Ψb by at most a physically meaningless overall sign
[see Eq. (2.12)]. More generally, this is also true if every
subsystem Uk is even or odd [see Eq. (3.5)]—or, in other
words, if each Uk has a definite univalence, where the
univalence W is the number of fermions modulo 2:
W ≡ Nf (mod 2). (8.1)
Therefore, if the subsystems in orthodox quantum me-
chanics are required to satisfy a fermion-number or uni-
valence superselection rule [57–60], the Schro¨dinger dy-
namics of Ψ does not depend on the order in which the
subsystems are multiplied.
An answer to this objection can be found in the grow-
ing consensus [32, 61–75] that most (if not all) superse-
lection rules are pragmatic expressions of practical lim-
itations on experimental capabilities rather than funda-
mental laws of nature. This suggests that, at the level of
fundamental theory, the superposition principle should
be taken seriously, not lightly brushed aside [154].
The practical limitation that gives rise to a particle-
number superselection rule in orthodox quantum me-
chanics is just the lack of a phase reference discussed in
Sec. VII A [74]. Since this limitation was already taken
into account in the analysis of Sec. VII and the discus-
sion of Sec. VIII A, it does not alter the conclusion that
subsystem permutations can have an observable effect on
subsystem dynamics.
C. Significance of a univalence superselection rule
Thus, if one wishes to eliminate the dependence of dy-
namics on subsystem permutations, one must introduce
the univalence superselection rule as an independent ax-
iom; it cannot be derived from the phase symmetry (7.4).
This rule would require all quasiclassical subsystems to
be even, but subsystem U1 could be even or odd. One
can easily verify that the univalence of all subsystems is
conserved by the time evolution (6.46) if [H,W ] = 0.
Introducing such a rule makes it easier to combine two
subsystems into one. Suppose, for example, we have two
subsystems localized in adjacent regions of coordinate
space. In such a case it seems natural to talk about using
the ψ product to merge these subsystems. However, this
cannot be done if they are separated in the product (4.4)
by a subsystem that commutes with neither of them,
even if that subsystem is localized far away in coordi-
nate space. The univalence superselection rule therefore
provides a natural framework for discussing composition
and decomposition of subsystems.
However, at present the question of whether to intro-
duce such an axiom is simply left open. The basic struc-
ture of the theory that follows does not depend on this
choice.
IX. A BARE-BONES THEORY OF
INFORMATION
At this stage the basic theory of subsystem dynamics
is more or less complete. The next step is to construct
a theory of information (or, in other words, a theory of
measurement) that connects the subsystem dynamics to
the experiences of observers. This paper develops such a
theory only at a very rudimentary level, focusing mostly
on qualitative questions such as “Whose information?”
and “Information about what?” [33] Detailed investiga-
tions of this theory of information are left for future work.
A. Bayesian inference in the present moment
The present theory of information is essentially just
a theory of Bayesian inference for individual observers
treated as subsystems of a closed system. The use of
Bayesian inference means that this theory has much in
common with QBism [53, 85–94]. However, it differs from
QBism in its assignment of subsystem vectors |uk〉 to all
observers whose experiences are being described.
Here the implementation of Bayesian inference is con-
trolled by two fundamental principles: (1) Each observer
experiences directly only the beables associated with one
subsystem |uk〉. All else must be inferred. In particular,
the existence of other subsystems is inferred from the
influence of those subsystems on the dynamics of |uk〉.
(2) Each observer experiences directly only the beables
associated with a single moment of time (a moment be-
ing defined as an infinitesimal interval of time). All else
must be inferred. In particular, the dynamics of all sub-
systems in the past and future of the present moment is
purely an inference.
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The meaning, significance, and historical context of
these statements are elaborated in this subsection. Their
mathematical implications are discussed in Sec. IX B.
Let us start with the case in which inferences are drawn
from the experiences of only one observer. In this case,
principle (1) says that the existence of other subsystems
is inferred from their influence on the dynamics of the
observer’s subsystem |uk〉. Interactions between particles
are crucial in this regard. If the particles do not interact,
the time evolution of |uk〉 is independent of the other
subsystems, so nothing at all can be inferred about the
properties of other subsystems.
The idea that an observer can only “measure” the state
of his own subsystem was proposed long ago by Lon-
don and Bauer [166, 167]. They described this capacity
of an observer as a “faculty of introspection.” London
and Bauer’s concept of measurement is therefore very
different from that of von Neumann [55], in which the
consciousness of the observer somehow directly perceives
the state of the outside world, even though the observer
is expressly excluded from this state.
In the present theory, the “faculty of introspection”
does not lead to any collapse of the total state vector |ψ〉.
Instead, the observer merely takes note of the beables
for subsystem |uk〉 (or some subset thereof) during the
present moment of time. This information is then used
by the observer to perform a Bayesian updating of the
probabilities that he ascribes to the various possible sub-
system decompositions of |ψ〉. Here Bayesian updating
is just the usual process of replacing prior probabilities
with posterior probabilities, in which the words “prior,”
“posterior,” and “updating” refer to a direction of logi-
cal inference, not to a direction in time. The total state
|ψ〉 is not assumed to be known, since all subsystems are
treated as initially unknown.
The idea that all observations are fundamentally self -
observations may seem strange from the perspective of
orthodox measurement theory [55], which requires an ob-
server to always be outside the observed system [168]. In-
deed the orthodox description is ostensibly the most nat-
ural one, since we intuitively regard our sense of vision as
a direct perception of the world around us. However, our
susceptibility to optical illusions shows clearly that the
three-dimensional world we see is actually an inference
based on very incomplete two-dimensional information
provided by the retinas [169].
The fact that observers are treated as subsystems does
not mean that the problem of consciousness must be
solved before this theory can be used. The theory merely
limits what can be known by any observer to the prop-
erties of a single subsystem. However, the consequences
of imposing such a limit can be evaluated by studying
simple non-biological subsystems. According to Wheeler
[4], it is “not consciousness but the distinction between
the probe and the probed [that is] central to the elemen-
tal quantum act of observation.” A similar remark was
made by Heisenberg [5]: “The observing system need not
always be a human being; it may also be an inanimate
apparatus, such as a photographic plate.”
Principle (2) bridges the gap between the “block uni-
verse” concept of time [170–172] used in most physical
theories and the subjective flow of time that each of us
experiences. According to Carnap [173], Bergson’s crit-
icism of the block universe picture [174–176] was deeply
troubling to Einstein:
Once Einstein said that the problem of the
Now worried him seriously. He explained that
the experience of the Now means something
special for man, something essentially differ-
ent from the past and the future, but that
this important difference does not and can-
not occur within physics. That this experi-
ence cannot be grasped by science seemed to
him a matter of painful but inevitable resig-
nation. . . . We both agreed that this was not
a question of a defect for which science could
be blamed, as Bergson thought.
The idea that the present moment does play a crucial
role in physics was emphasized by Wheeler in connection
with his “delayed-choice” experiments [177–179]:
The “past” is theory. The past has no exis-
tence except as it is recorded in the present.
Wheeler’s central message is that everything we say
about the past is necessarily an inference based on
records in the present. This is of course a platitude for
historians and paleontologists, but it carries important
lessons for experimental physicists as well [180].
Everett [181–183], Bell [131, 184, 185], Barbour [43,
186, 187], and Page [41] have suggested ways of tak-
ing this into account by restructuring quantum theory
around the records contained in the present value of |ψ〉.
Mermin [91, 92, 188], Hartle [189], and Smolin [190] have
all recently called attention to the physical significance
of the present. But Zeh has remarked that “physics does
not even offer any conceptual means for deriving the con-
cept of a present that would objectively separate the past
from the future” [172].
Here this concept is not derived ; rather, it is built into
the theory of information as a fundamental axiom about
the subjective experiences of observers. The subjective
nature of the Now was stressed by Zeh [172], and its im-
portance for the foundations of both classical and quan-
tum physics has been emphasized especially by Mermin
[91, 92].
It should be noted that the infinitesimal time interval
referred to in principle (2) is different from the finite time
interval (of “perhaps a few tenths of a second” [188])
that is associated with our intuitive perception of the
present. As discussed by Barbour [43, 186] and Hartle
[189], the perceived duration of the present moment is
probably related to the way in which information about
the immediate past is stored and processed in the brain.
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B. Mathematical backbone for inferences
Let us now examine some mathematical implications
of the fundamental principles discussed in Sec. IX A. The
first step is to consider ideal observers, each of whom is
fully aware of every detail of the state of her subsystem.
This is of course unrealistic, as an observer’s experience
will in general tell her only the values of some subset of
the beables associated with her subsystem. The conse-
quences of this further restriction are discussed below in
Sec. IX E.
To begin, let us review the way in which the principle
of dynamical stability was used in Sec. VI. The problem
solved there was a time evolution problem. The initial
subsystems |uk〉 were all assumed to be known; the un-
known quantities were the final subsystems |u′k〉. The
initial and final subsystems were assumed to differ only
infinitesimally. The known subsystems were held fixed
and the unknown subsystems were varied so as to maxi-
mize the dynamical stability functional χ, subject to the
constraint that the total states |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 satisfy the
Schro¨dinger equation (6.18).
The problem of concern now is an environmental stabi-
lization problem, in which environmental subsystems are
used to stabilize the overall subsystem decomposition.
The difference lies in the classification of known and un-
known subsystem states. Let us write the total number
of subsystems as
m = s+ r, (9.1)
in which s is the number of subsystems that are classified
as observers; the remaining r subsystems are regarded as
parts of the environment. For the environmental sta-
bilization problem, all observer states |uk〉 and |u′k〉 are
treated as known quantities (defined by the experiences
of the observers), whereas the environmental states |uk〉
and |u′k〉 are treated as unknown. As before, the initial
and final subsystems are assumed to differ only infinites-
imally. As before, the known subsystems are held fixed
and the unknown subsystems are varied so as to maxi-
mize χ, subject to the constraint that |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 satisfy
the Schro¨dinger equation.
The solutions of the environmental stabilization prob-
lem are pairs (|u〉, |u′〉) of subsystem decompositions.
Each such pair has its own (infinitesimal) time interval
∆t, which is the duration of the present moment associ-
ated with that pair. This is always an inferred quantity
because ∆t is defined only for the subsystem decompo-
sition as a whole, not for individual subsystems. Once
the environmental stabilization problem has been solved,
we can use time evolution to extrapolate any given pair
(|u〉, |u′〉) into the past and future of ∆t.
From their definition as variation problems, the time
evolution and environmental stabilization problems each
lead to a set of equations in which the number of equa-
tions is equal to the number of unknown variables. How-
ever, there is a big difference in the difficulty of these sets
of equations. The time evolution problem leads to a set
of linear equations (see Sec. VI E), whereas the environ-
mental stabilization problem leads to a set of nonlinear
equations.
The latter set of equations is not written out explicitly
here, but its qualitative properties can easily be seen by
returning to the model system introduced in Sec. VI F
(i.e., a system of interacting fermions). In this model,
each state |uk〉 or |u′k〉 can be regarded as a function
of (2d − 1) independent complex variables or 2(2d − 1)
independent real variables, where d = dimHf . The dy-
namical stability functional χ is a rational function of
these variables. The environmental stabilization prob-
lem therefore requires one to find the common zeros of
a set of rational functions. This is a difficult but well
defined problem in algebraic geometry [111].
However, since the author has no training in this field,
the surest route to progress is to publicize the problem
and invite experts in algebraic geometry to work on it.
For this reason, the quest for explicit solutions shall not
be pursued any further here. The existence of solutions
is simply taken for granted. Indeed, since the environ-
mental stabilization problem is nonlinear, it may have
many solutions [in contrast to the time evolution prob-
lem, for which the set of linear equations (6.45) has a
unique solution (6.46)]. If no univalence superselection
rule is imposed (see Sec. VIII C), there will in general
be a different set of solutions for each possible permuta-
tion of the subsystems, thus further increasing the total
number of solutions.
Assuming that the environmental stabilization prob-
lem can be solved, how do we use its solutions to perform
Bayesian inference? Consider the set of pairs (|u〉, |u′〉) of
subsystem decompositions that satisfy the environmental
stabilization problem for all possible choices of observer
states. In this set, the observer states are not required
to agree with the experiences of the observers. However,
to fix the scale of the subsystem changes, the Fubini–
Study distance between the sets of observer states in |u〉
and |u′〉 is required to be the same as that given by the
experiences of the observers.
The first step in the Bayesian inference problem is to
assign a prior probability to each pair (|u〉, |u′〉) in this
set. The choice of prior probability is subjective [80–82],
although with some work it may be possible to reduce the
degree of subjectivity to a choice of symmetry principle
[77, 78]. Posterior probabilities are then obtained simply
by setting to zero the probabilities of all pairs (|u〉, |u′〉)
that have the wrong observer states (i.e., states incon-
sistent with the experiences of the observers) and renor-
malizing.
The outcome of this inference problem is reminiscent
of Wheeler’s definition of reality [4]:
The vision of what we call “reality” is in
large measure of a pale and theoretic hue.
It is framed by a few iron posts of true
observation—themselves also resting on the-
ory for their meaning—but most of the walls
and towers in the vision are of papier-maˆche´,
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plastered in between those posts by an im-
mense labor of imagination and theory.
Here the iron posts are the observer subsystems in the
present moment; everything else is inferred. In general,
an observer’s experiences in the present moment have a
definiteness that is lacking in her memory of her infer-
ences about that moment [191]. This plays a role similar
to the “reduction of the wave packet” in orthodox quan-
tum mechanics [6].
It must be emphasized that this is only an analogy.
No actual “jump” is supposed to take place; there is only
a contrast between expectations and experiences. The
analogy with the orthodox description of wave-packet re-
duction [6] is actually rather distant. A closer analogy
can be found in the dynamical reduction models of Ghi-
rardi and others [138]. In these models the reduction pro-
cess is continuous, and the beables are defined in terms
of expectation values (rather than eigenvalues) of opera-
tors, just as in Sec. IV A. In the present paper, however,
the beables are not limited to mass density in coordinate
space, and the effective “reduction” takes place only at
the subsystem level, leaving the Schro¨dinger dynamics of
the total system untouched.
C. How many subsystems?
Are there any general criteria for choosing the subsys-
tem numbers s and r? This question is easiest to answer
for the number of environmental subsystems r. As argued
below, the sharpness of Bayesian inferences can be max-
imized by choosing the smallest possible value: namely,
r = 1 [192]. The choice of the number of observers s
requires a longer answer, as it occupies the borderland
between subjectivity and objectivity.
The value r = 1 is favored by Occam’s razor, which can
be regarded as a corollary of Bayesian probability theory
[193]. The basic argument is that, for any given value
of s, the number of solutions to the environmental stabi-
lization problem can be expected to increase rapidly as
a function of r. This statement is plausible because both
the number of equations and the degree of the polynomi-
als involved are increasing functions of r. It is, however,
not possible to prove this claim without actually solving
the environmental stabilization problem. The sharpest
Bayesian inferences are thus expected to be given by
r = 1.
The most obvious value to choose for the number of
observers is also s = 1. This choice seems to be consis-
tent with each person’s intuitive view of the world. If we
assume that Darwinian natural selection has instilled in
us a rough facsimile of the above Bayesian inference pro-
cess as the basis for our perception of the world around us
(which is, admittedly, a big assumption), then it would
be difficult to explain how natural selection could settle
on any value other than s = 1.
This instinctive value—the one used for the automatic
subconscious inferences that underlie our perception of
the world—cannot be changed. We cannot separate these
subconscious inferences from our raw sense impressions
any more than we could measure the bare (unrenormal-
ized) charge of an electron in quantum electrodynamics.
However, the value of primary concern here is not this
instinctive value but the value of s used for conscious
mathematical calculations in quantum mechanics.
The value most commonly chosen in this context is
also s = 1. A division of the world into observer and
observed is the foundation for the quantum theory of
measurement used by Heisenberg [5], von Neumann [55],
and many others. As Zeh has noted [154, 194], it is never
strictly necessary to introduce any other subsystems.
However, this choice leaves one open to a charge of
solipsism, because each of us has experiences that include
encounters with other human beings. Choosing s = 1
confines each observer to a hermitage, within which the
experiences of others are treated only as inferences, never
as primary data. Different observers will therefore always
base their worldviews on mutually exclusive subsystem
decompositions. This leads inevitably to Wheeler’s ques-
tion [179, 195]:
What keeps these images of something “out
there” from degenerating into separate and
private universes: one observer, one universe;
another observer, another universe?
Wheeler’s answers are cryptic but instructive:
That is prevented by the very solidity of
those iron posts, the elementary acts of
observership-participancy.
That is the importance of Bohr’s point that
no observation is an observation unless we can
communicate the results of that observation
to others in plain language. [196]
Translated from Wheelerian poetry into the language
of the present theory, the first answer says that al-
though different observers always have different expe-
riences, these experiences—the iron posts—are not af-
fected by the choice of s. A subsystem decomposition is
just a tool observers use to draw inferences from their
experiences. The only thing affected by the choice of s is
the set of inferences. Choosing s > 1 facilitates intersub-
jective agreement by allowing multiple observers to have
equal status within the theory.
The second answer says that if we are to believe that
the image of an outside world depicted by these inferences
is anything more than a mirage or a hallucination, the
essential features of this image must be independent of
the value of s used to perform the inferences. Indeed, we
can take the set of those features that are robust under
increases of s as the definition of what is objective. Here
the word “objective” is used in roughly the sense defined
by Primas [14, p. 352]:
That is, objectivity can never mean anything
else but conditional intersubjective agree-
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ment, conditioned by a jointly accepted con-
text. The criterion of objectivity is that the
perceptions can be shared.
The idea that “objective” properties are necessarily con-
textual dates back at least to Bohr’s thoughts on comple-
mentarity [196, 197]. Here the “jointly accepted context”
is the entire structure of the present theory of informa-
tion. The “perceptions [that] can be shared” are the com-
mon features of the worldview that emerges in the limit
of many observers. Communication between observers
therefore plays a central role in establishing which ele-
ments of the theory are meaningful [179, 195, 198, 199].
To flesh out these answers, it is necessary to explain
how the theory works when s > 1. The most egalitarian
approach would be to assign all probabilities as a team.
A minimum requirement for forming such a team is to get
all teammates to agree to assign unit probability to the
hypothesis that “you are a being very much like myself,
with your own private experience” [93]. Prior probabili-
ties are assigned by team consensus and can be regarded
as an expression of gambling commitments by the team
as a whole. Inferences drawn from such calculations can
then be used as the basis for group decisions.
Of course, this egalitarian approach is somewhat in
tension with the subconscious inferences that define each
observer’s intuitive worldview. Members of such a team
might still be wise to make personal decisions by assign-
ing less than unit probability to the hypotheses that the
other teammates always tell the truth and never make
mistakes. If the reported experiences of these team-
mates are weighted accordingly, the resulting monarchi-
cal structure is no longer fully egalitarian. However, it is
not solipsist either, as long as these weights are nonzero.
This type of monarchy is the closest point of ap-
proach between QBism and the present theory. QBism
requires quantum mechanics to be a “single-user theory”
[87, 89, 90, 93] but also emphasizes that communications
with others can (and should) form part of the basis for
single-user quantum state assignments. The two theories
are not directly comparable because the words “user”
(in QBism) and “observer” (in this paper) have different
mathematical implications. In particular, the single-user
theory of the QBist is not equivalent to choosing s = 1
in the present theory, because according to the principles
of Sec. IX A (which are not part of QBism), the choice
s = 1 does not allow the experiences of more than one
observer to be included in any way.
It should also be noted that the QBist arguments for
requiring quantum mechanics to be a single-user theory
do not rule out the possibility of choosing s > 1 in the
present theory. The basic argument is that “my internal
personal experience is inaccessible to you except insofar
as I attempt to represent it to you verbally, and vice-
versa” [93]. But this is irrelevant here, because neither
classical nor quantum Bayesian theory has any direct
contact with internal personal experience; it can only
deal with what can be distilled out of that experience
and represented mathematically [200]. But what can be
described mathematically can also be communicated to
another person “in plain language” [196]. So there is no
reason why these mathematical representations of per-
sonal experiences cannot be pooled and used as the basis
for group inferences, in the manner described above.
D. Strong dynamical stability
As shown in Sec. IX C, the sharpness of Bayesian in-
ferences can be optimized with respect to the number
of environmental subsystems by choosing r = 1. How-
ever, given that the environmental stabilization problem
of Sec. IX B has not yet been solved, it is not possible at
this stage to say whether the resulting inferences would
be sharp enough to be comparable to the predictions of
orthodox quantum mechanics. The situation could be
similar to that pointed out by Zurek [156] in connection
with the consistent histories formulation of quantum me-
chanics [201–204], where the consistency conditions alone
are not sufficiently selective to single out emergent clas-
sical behavior.
Given this possibility, it is of interest to consider
whether there are any means available for further sharp-
ening of inferences. The method discussed here is based
on a strengthening of the principle of dynamical stabil-
ity. The basic idea is similar to the concept of the “pre-
dictability sieve” introduced by Zurek [156, 157].
The environmental stabilization problem of Sec. IX B
involves holding the observer states fixed and maximizing
χ with respect to variations in the environmental states.
The observer states can be chosen arbitrarily, subject
only to the (implicit) requirement of leading to a math-
ematically well defined variation problem.
But is this complete freedom of choice necessary?
Might it be possible to narrow down the choices by max-
imizing χ with respect to all subsystem states, including
those of the observers? The choice of observer states
would then no longer be completely arbitrary, but if this
variation problem has a sufficiently large number of so-
lutions, it may still be possible to account for the actual
experiences of observers.
For obvious reasons, the variational principle thus de-
fined is called the strong principle of dynamical stability.
Subsystem decompositions derived from this principle are
maximally stable, in the sense that they are constrained
solely by the requirement that |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 satisfy the
Schro¨dinger equation. Given that our experience of the
world does have a certain stability, it is at least plausible
that this experience is congruent with strong dynamical
stability.
The selective power of strong dynamical stability is
most noticeable in a context where the observer’s per-
ception of her state is assumed not to be infinitely pre-
cise. Given that an observer’s experience is only capable
of selecting a certain continuous range of states, strong
dynamical stability may be able to narrow the possibili-
ties down to a much smaller (perhaps finite) subset. This
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would lead to sharper Bayesian inferences.
E. The rest of the skeleton: Complementarity and
“phenomenon”
Let us now consider the effect of removing the restric-
tion to ideal observers imposed in Sec. IX B. What an
observer actually perceives is not the state of her subsys-
tem but some subset of the beables for that subsystem.
The perceived values of these beables may be consistent
with more than one state |uk〉, so the state must be in-
ferred from the beables. This imposes another layer of
inference, thus making the inferences drawn by a real ob-
server less sharp than those drawn by an ideal observer.
The reason why all beables are not perceived is proba-
bly Darwinian. Survival requires an efficient mechanism
for drawing inferences about the outside world, and it is
most efficient to focus attention on those beables with the
greatest signal-to-noise ratio and ignore the rest. This
signal-to-noise ratio can be greatly enhanced by sense
organs, so the set of perceived beables may vary between
organisms with a different evolutionary history. How-
ever, the degree of variation is also constrained by effi-
ciency considerations, since slowly changing beables are
easier to keep track of than rapidly changing ones. All
beables change more slowly under the strong principle
of dynamical stability (Sec. IX D), but some still change
more slowly than others. This limits the possible sets of
beables that it is worth developing sense organs for.
The question of which beables are most stable—thus
readily seized upon by Darwinian natural selection—is
essentially just the “preferred basis problem” of deco-
herence theory [205]. Given that particle interactions
are typically functions of number operators in coordi-
nate space, the expectation values of such operators (see
Sec. IV A) will play the most prominent role in a strongly
interacting system. This yields a description similar to
the mass-density beables of dynamical reduction theories
[136–138]. However, in general one must consider the dy-
namics generated by the total Hamiltonian, not just the
interaction Hamiltonian. This typically shifts the arena
from coordinate space to phase space [205].
Bohr’s principle of complementarity [196, 197] is an
immediate corollary of these Darwinian restrictions on
the subset of perceived beables. Given that all infer-
ences are performed in the present moment, it is sim-
ply impossible for an observer to infer definite values
for all beables of her environment from a limited set of
her own beables. But the set of sharply inferred envi-
ronmental beables may change with her experiences in
the present moment—depending, for example, on which
piece of measurement apparatus she is looking at.
The fact that all subsystem beables are defined in the
present theory, but not all of them play an active role in
the worldview of observers, is similar to ideas used pre-
viously in modal interpretations of quantum mechanics.
As noted by Vink [206] and Bub [207, 208], in modal in-
terpretations it is possible to assign definite values to all
possible observables without violating the Bell–Kochen–
Specker theorem [209–211] for the measured values of ob-
servables. The axiomatic foundations of the theory can
thus be simplified by allowing the process of measure-
ment (or, in the present case, Bayesian inference from a
Darwinian subset) to take up some of the burden that
would otherwise be shouldered by a restriction of the al-
lowed beables.
As discussed in Sec. IX C, our conscious experiences are
largely based on subconscious inferences about the struc-
ture of our environment. We seem to perceive a “real”
three-dimensional butterfly rather than a pair of two-
dimensional butterfly-shaped patterns on our retinas. In
order to match our conscious experiences to the math-
ematical structure of the present theory of information,
we have to infer the latter description from the former.
This additional layer of (inverse) inference makes the the-
ory even more complicated. However, such a description
is arguably more reasonable than assuming that we di-
rectly perceive the three-dimensional butterfly, which is
the approach used in orthodox quantum mechanics.
This type of automatic subconscious inference (i.e., an
inference about the environment based on a Darwinian-
restricted set of observer beables) is an example of what
Bohr and Wheeler call a “phenomenon” [83, 177, 178,
195]. A phenomenon is subjective in the sense that it
depends on the sensory apparatus of the observer. For
example, although the inferred “blackening of a grain of
silver bromide” constitutes a phenomenon for us [178], it
presumably would not be regarded as such by a Kentucky
cave shrimp, which lives its entire life underground and
has no eyes.
F. Comparison with other quantum theories
The essence of the theory of information outlined here
is its reliance upon inferences from the properties of a
limited number of subsystems in the present moment. In
some ways this is similar to the Everett interpretation
[181, 182], which also uses the properties of one subsys-
tem to make inferences about others and also relies on
memories and records in the present to make inferences
about the past. However, Everett defines subsystems us-
ing the traditional tensor product of vector spaces, and he
defines the present to be an instant rather than a moment
(i.e., a point on the real line rather than an interval).
Because Everett’s subsystems are entangled, he intro-
duces the relative-state concept as a new axiom [55] that
allows him to infer the state of the outside world from
the instantaneous state of the observer. However, this
inference assumes knowledge of the total state |ψ〉. It
is not clear how such an instantaneous inference scheme
can get off the ground if the observer starts in a state
of ignorance of |ψ〉. That is, it is not clear why an ob-
server using such a scheme would have any justification
for believing that knowledge of his own present state says
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anything about the state of his environment.
By contrast, the subsystems in the present theory are
defined to be unentangled quantum objects, and infer-
ences are based on an infinitesimal time interval rather
than a single point in time. The information about dy-
namics contained in this interval then allows an observer
to infer something about the state of the environment
even when the observer has no prior information about
the environment. Of course, it is not clear whether this
scheme can get off the ground either; at this stage, it is
only a conjecture that the solution of the environmental
stabilization problem (in either the original form of Sec.
IX B or the strong form of Sec. IX D) will provide infer-
ences sharp enough to say anything significant about the
environment. However, it is reasonable to assume that
inferences from a moment in time would be considerably
sharper than instantaneous inferences.
Bell has said that the really novel element in Everett’s
theory is “a repudiation of the concept of the ‘past’,”
although he acknowledges that this interpretation might
not be accepted by Everett [185]. Bell did not endorse
this interpretation, which Kucharˇ has described as “solip-
sism of an instant” [212]. For the reasons described
above, this label might indeed be warranted for a truly
instantaneous inference scheme.
However, the momentary inference scheme adopted
here does not require a wholesale repudiation of the con-
cept of the past. Rather, it places limits on what can be
said about the past. It remains to be seen whether these
limits are in quantitative agreement with the experiences
of observers.
This approach also places limits on what can be said
about the future. As noted near the end of Sec. IX B,
the contrast between an observer’s inferences about the
future and her experiences in successive present moments
has an effect roughly comparable to the quantum jumps
of orthodox quantum theory.
The definition of subsystems used by Everett is the
same as that used in nearly all other formulations of
quantum mechanics. The vector spaces entering into the
tensor product have no dynamics and can be chosen ar-
bitrarily at different times. Because the resulting sub-
system states are not objects (see Sec. I A), it is mean-
ingless to compare their observable properties directly
with those of the present theory. The subsystems in the
two theories simply refer to different things. Given this
qualitative difference, perhaps the only meaningful test
of the present theory would be a direct comparison be-
tween theory and experiment.
G. Is anything missing?
When one is contemplating the possible outcomes
of such a comparison, two other qualitative differences
between this theory and standard quantum mechanics
stand out. One is that the quasiclassical subsystems used
here have indefinite particle numbers (see Sec. III B).
Therefore, they cannot directly replicate standard text-
book problems for distinguishable subsystems with defi-
nite particle numbers. Instead, these subsystems seem to
enforce a compliance with Bohr’s emphasis on the “whole
experimental arrangement” [83]. That is, they would
only be able to describe a hydrogen atom as a part of
a larger subsystem, not as a subsystem by itself.
Another difference is the way in which observable (or
beable) quantities were defined in Sec. IV A. This defini-
tion is based on what would conventionally be described
as expectation values rather than eigenvalues. The phys-
ical picture is closest to the “density of stuff” interpre-
tation [33] used in the dynamical reduction models of
Ghirardi and others [136–138], but with the continuous
“reduction” occurring in the subsystem states |uk〉 rather
than the total system state |ψ〉 (see Sec. IX B).
Taken together, these differences raise doubts as to
whether the present theory would be able to replicate
the innumerable successful predictions of orthodox quan-
tum mechanics. A particular concern is whether there is
any element of this theory comparable to the discrete
eigenvalue spectra predicted for the results of ideal mea-
surements in orthodox quantum mechanics.
However, the predictions of dynamical reduction mod-
els are well known to be experimentally indistinguish-
able (given the current state of experimental capabilities)
from those of orthodox quantum mechanics [138]. This
shows it is unnecessary to define beables as eigenvalues.
Since the definition of beables used in Sec. IV A is just
a generalization of the one used in dynamical reduction
models, it is not unreasonable to expect it to yield com-
parable results. Testing this conjecture is a key challenge
for future research.
X. CONCLUSIONS
This paper arose from the observation that ordinary
many-particle quantum mechanics has a hitherto unno-
ticed mathematical structure that can be interpreted as
an unentangled subsystem decomposition. This structure
relies on the superposition of different numbers of parti-
cles, but it also permits a full description of the equiv-
alence relation that leads to a particle-number superse-
lection rule in orthodox quantum mechanics. The goal
of the paper was to take this structure seriously and see
what it leads to. Can the elimination of entanglement be-
tween subsystems help to resolve some of the conceptual
difficulties at the heart of quantum mechanics?
To build on this foundation, one must link the sub-
system states to the experiences of observers. The first
step is the definition of time as a functional of subsys-
tem changes. This functional can then be embedded
into a dynamical stability functional that describes the
subsystem dynamics. The resulting subsystem decom-
positions change by the smallest amount consistent with
Schro¨dinger dynamics for the total system. This change
is deterministic.
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The observable or “beable” properties of subsystems
are defined as expectation values of the conventional op-
erators in many-particle quantum mechanics. These be-
ables include, but are not limited to, the mass density
functions used in dynamical reduction theories. An ob-
server could in principle experience any beable associated
with her subsystem. However, for Darwinian reasons it is
assumed that only those beables with the greatest signal-
to-noise ratio are experienced.
An observer’s experiences are also limited to the
present moment of time. These experiences are the “iron
posts” upon which our concept of reality is based. From
them, an observer can infer the existence of an outside
world together with a past and future of the present
moment. These inferences are extremely useful tools
that are indispensable for us to “orient ourselves in the
labyrinth of sense impressions,” but they always remain
an “arbitrary creation of the human (or animal) mind”
[213–215]. The resulting image of the world is thus un-
avoidably subjective. Objectivity emerges only in the
limit of many observers.
Much work remains to be done in order to fill in the
details of the theory of information outlined here. The
most important task is to solve the variation problem in
which an environmental subsystem is used to stabilize
the dynamics of the observer subsystems in the present
moment. Only then will it be possible to see whether
the inferences derived in this way are in sufficiently close
agreement with experience to be useful.
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Appendix A: Associativity of the ψ product
The ψ product (2.11) is associative if
(|u(k)〉|v(l)〉)|w(m)〉 = |u(k)〉 (|v(l)〉|w(m)〉) (A1)
for all |u(k)〉 ∈ S(Hk), |v(l)〉 ∈ S(Hl), and |w(m)〉 ∈
S(Hm). The explicit form of the associativity condition
given by the definition (2.11) is
c(k, l)c(k + l,m)S[S(|u(k)〉 ⊗ |v(l)〉)⊗ |w(m)〉]
= c(k, l +m)c(l,m)S[|u(k)〉 ⊗ S(|v(l)〉 ⊗ |w(m)〉)]. (A2)
This appendix examines the implications of this con-
straint for the function c(k, l).
Now it is well known that [95, 103–105]
S(|u〉 ⊗ |v〉) = S(|u〉 ⊗ S|v〉) = S(S|u〉 ⊗ |v〉) (A3)
for all |u〉 ∈ Hp and |v〉 ∈ Hq. Equation (A2) conse-
quently reduce to the condition
c(k, l)c(k + l,m) = c(k, l +m)c(l,m), (A4)
which must be satisfied in order for the ψ product to be
associative.
To solve this equation, it is convenient to follow the
procedure suggested on p. 401 of Ref. [104]. Define a
function f(l) recursively by the relation
f(l + 1) = c(1, l)f(l). (A5)
In the special case k = 1, Eq. (A4) gives
c(l + 1,m)
c(l,m)
=
c(1, l +m)
c(1, l)
=
f(l +m+ 1)f(l)
f(l +m)f(l + 1)
, (A6)
in which c(1, l) = f(l+ 1)/f(l) was used in the last step.
But this is just a special case of a more general relation
c(l + k,m)
c(l,m)
=
f(l +m+ k)f(l)
f(l +m)f(l + k)
, (A7)
which can be proved by mathematical induction. In the
identity
c(l + k + 1,m)
c(l,m)
=
c(l + k + 1,m)
c(l + k,m)
c(l + k,m)
c(l,m)
, (A8)
one can replace the first term using Eq. (A6) (with l →
l + k) and the second term using Eq. (A7). This gives
c(l + k + 1,m)
c(l,m)
=
f(l + k +m+ 1)f(l + k)
f(l + k +m)f(l + k + 1)
× f(l +m+ k)f(l)
f(l +m)f(l + k)
=
f(l +m+ k + 1)f(l)
f(l +m)f(l + k + 1)
, (A9)
which shows that Eq. (A7) holds for k + 1 whenever it
holds for k. The initial condition (A6) then establishes
that (A7) holds for all k ≥ 1. (Of course, it is trivially
valid when k = 0 too.)
Substituting k = q − l in Eq. (A7) then gives
c(q,m)
c(l,m)
=
f(q +m)f(l)
f(l +m)f(q)
, (A10)
which becomes
c(q,m)
c(1,m)
=
f(q +m)f(1)
f(m+ 1)f(q)
(A11)
when l = 1. Replacing c(1,m) = f(m + 1)/f(m) then
yields the desired solution
c(q,m) =
f(q +m)f(1)
f(q)f(m)
, (A12)
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showing that c(q,m) = c(m, q).
When m = 0, this reduces to
c(q, 0) = c(0, q) =
f(1)
f(0)
, (A13)
which is independent of q. The value of c(q, 0) can be
fixed by requiring the vacuum state |0〉 to serve as a mul-
tiplicative identity for the ψ product [cf. Eq. (2.6)]:
|0〉  |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉  |0〉 = |Ψ〉 ∀|Ψ〉 ∈ Fs(H). (A14)
Imposing this condition when |Ψ〉 = |u(q)〉 gives c(q, 0) =
1 or f(0) = f(1). The result |f(0)| = |f(1)| can also
be derived from cluster decomposition, as shown in Ap-
pendix B.
The recursive definition (A5) of f(l) leaves one value
of f(l) that can be chosen arbitrarily. It is convenient to
choose f(1) = 1, thus reducing Eq. (A12) to Eq. (2.13),
which was to be proved.
Appendix B: Cluster decomposition theorem
This appendix contains a proof of Theorem 1, which
is about the cluster decomposition property 〈st|uv〉 =
〈s|u〉〈t|v〉 of the inner product in Fs(H). This inner prod-
uct is derived from the inner product in F(H) and the
definition of the ψ product in Eqs. (2.11) and (2.13).
To define the inner product in F(H), let
|α1α2 · · ·αn) = |α1〉 ⊗ |α2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αn〉 (B1)
denote a general tensor-product state in Hn, where
|αk〉 ∈ H. The set {|αk〉} is not assumed to be linearly
independent or normalized. The rounded bracket on the
ket |α1α2 · · ·αn) distinguishes this unsymmetrized ten-
sor product from the symmetrized product |α1α2 · · ·αn〉
defined in Eqs. (2.16) and (2.17).
The inner product of two such tensor products is de-
fined in the usual way as [6]
(α1 · · ·αn|β1 · · ·βn) = 〈α1|β1〉 · · · 〈αn|βn〉, (B2)
where 〈αk|βk〉 is the inner product in H. Now let {|ei〉}
be an orthonormal basis in H. The corresponding tensor
products
|ei1 · · · ein) = |ei1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ein〉 (B3)
therefore form an orthonormal basis in Hn, since
(ei1 · · · ein |ej1 · · · ejn) = δi1j1 · · · δinjn . (B4)
These elementary results can now be used to evaluate
the inner product 〈st|uv〉 of the vectors |st〉 = |s〉  |t〉
and |uv〉 = |u〉|v〉 in Theorem 1. The kets |s〉 ∈ Fs(H1)
and |t〉 ∈ Fs(H2) are expanded as
|s〉 =
∑
k
|s(k)〉, |t〉 =
∑
l
|t(l)〉, (B5)
in which |s(k)〉 ∈ S(Hk) and |t(l)〉 ∈ S(Hl). Hence
|st〉 =
∑
k
∑
l
|s(k)〉  |t(l)〉 =
∑
k
∑
l
|s(k)t(l)〉, (B6)
in which |s(k)t(l)〉 ∈ S(Hk+l). With a similar expansion
for |uv〉, we can write
〈st|uv〉 =
∑
kl
∑
mn
〈s(k)t(l)|u(m)v(n)〉. (B7)
Here 〈s(k)t(l)|u(m)v(n)〉 is zero unless k+ l = m+n, since
states with different numbers of particles are orthogonal.
But due to the orthogonality of the subspaces H1 and
H2, a stronger restriction is possible: 〈s(k)t(l)|u(m)v(n)〉
is zero unless k = m and l = n. Thus
〈st|uv〉 =
∑
kl
〈s(k)t(l)|u(k)v(l)〉. (B8)
The definition (2.11) of the ψ product can now be used
to write
|u(k)v(l)〉 = c(k, l)S(|u(k)〉 ⊗ |v(l)〉). (B9)
Here associativity requires c(k, l) to have the form de-
rived in Appendix A:
c(k, l) =
f(k + l)
f(k)f(l)
, f(1) = 1, (B10)
but the function f(k) has not yet been determined.
The inner product (B8) is therefore
〈st|uv〉 =
∑
kl
|c(k, l)|2(〈s(k)| ⊗ 〈t(l)|)S†S(|u(k)〉 ⊗ |v(l)〉).
(B11)
Since S is an orthogonal projector, S†S = S2 = S, thus
〈st|uv〉 =
∑
kl
|c(k, l)|2(〈s(k)| ⊗ 〈t(l)|)S(|u(k)〉 ⊗ |v(l)〉).
(B12)
Here (|u(k)〉 ⊗ |v(l)〉) ∈ Hk+l, so the definition of S gives
S(|u(k)〉 ⊗ |v(l)〉) = 1
(k + l)!
∑
σ
ε(σ)σ(|u(k)〉 ⊗ |v(l)〉).
(B13)
Now if the product (|u(k)〉 ⊗ |v(l)〉) is expanded in the
unsymmetrized basis of Eq. (B3) (with n = k + l), the
first k vectors |ei〉 will be from H1 and the last l vec-
tors will be from H2. The same is true for the product
(|s(k)〉 ⊗ |t(l)〉). The only permutations σ in equation
(B13) that contribute nonvanishing terms to equation
(B12) are therefore those that do not interchange any
of the first k vectors with the last l vectors. These per-
mutations are of the form σ = σ1σ2, where σ1 is any
permutation of the first k vectors and σ2 is any permu-
tation of the last l vectors.
33
The orthogonality of the basis vectors (B3) therefore
reduces Eq. (B12) to
〈st|uv〉 =
∑
kl
|c(k, l)|2
(k + l)!
∑
σ1
ε(σ1)〈s(k)|σ1|u(k)〉
×
∑
σ2
ε(σ2)〈t(l)|σ2|v(l)〉, (B14)
in which ε(σ1σ2) = ε(σ1)ε(σ2) was used. Now |u(k)〉 ∈
S(Hk), so σ1|u(k)〉 = ε(σ1)|u(k)〉, and likewise σ2|v(l)〉 =
ε(σ2)|v(l)〉. But [ε(σ)]2 = 1 for any σ, hence
〈st|uv〉 =
∑
kl
|c(k, l)|2
(k + l)!
∑
σ1
〈s(k)|u(k)〉
∑
σ2
〈t(l)|v(l)〉 (B15)
=
∑
kl
∣∣∣∣ f(k + l)f(k)f(l)
∣∣∣∣2 k!l!(k + l)! 〈s(k)|u(k)〉〈t(l)|v(l)〉.
(B16)
At this point, choosing |f(k)| = √k! eliminates all of
the numerical factors, yielding
〈st|uv〉 =
∑
k
〈s(k)|u(k)〉
∑
l
〈t(l)|v(l)〉. (B17)
Each factor can be rewritten as∑
k
〈s(k)|u(k)〉 =
∑
k
∑
m
〈s(k)|u(m)〉 = 〈s|u〉, (B18)
since 〈s(k)|u(m)〉 = 0 when k 6= m. Therefore 〈st|uv〉 =
〈s|u〉〈t|v〉, thus proving the “if” part of the cluster de-
composition theorem 1.
Conversely, suppose it is given that 〈st|uv〉 = 〈s|u〉〈t|v〉
for all |s〉, |u〉 ∈ Fs(H1) and all |t〉, |v〉 ∈ Fs(H2), where
H1 and H2 are orthogonal subspaces of H. What does
this tell us about f(k)?
Under the given conditions, we are free to choose |u〉 =
|u(k)〉 and |v〉 = |v(l)〉 for any values of k and l. Equation
(B16) then reduces to
〈st|uv〉 =
∣∣∣∣ f(k + l)f(k)f(l)
∣∣∣∣2 k!l!(k + l)! 〈s(k)|u(k)〉〈t(l)|v(l)〉, (B19)
with no summation on k and l. Likewise
〈s|u〉〈t|v〉 = 〈s(k)|u(k)〉〈t(l)|v(l)〉. (B20)
Hence, 〈st|uv〉 = 〈s|u〉〈t|v〉 in all such cases only if∣∣∣∣ f(k + l)f(k)f(l)
∣∣∣∣2 = (k + l)!k!l! ∀k, l ≥ 0. (B21)
Setting l = 1 and using f(1) = 1 then gives
|f(k + 1)|2 = (k + 1)|f(k)|2. (B22)
This defines |f(k)|2 recursively as
|f(k)|2 = k!|f(1)|2 = k! (k ≥ 1), (B23)
while k = 0 gives |f(1)|2 = |f(0)|2. Hence, |f(k)| = √k!
for all k, thus completing the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix C: Algebraic closure conditions for bosons
This appendix describes the construction of the boson
vector space Fψ(Hb) mentioned at the end of Sec. II D.
The objective is to identify a subspace of Fs(Hb) that is a
good match for the algebra of the boson ψ product. This
algebra is easiest to describe using the Segal–Bargmann
representation of Fock space [216–219], which is often
used in the definition of coherent boson states [96, 121,
122].
Let us start by establishing a concise notation. Stan-
dard basis kets in Fock space are written as |n〉, where
n = (n1, n2, . . . , nb) ∈ Nb is a vector of nonnegative inte-
gers, b is the dimension of the single-boson Hilbert space
Hb, and ni is the number of bosons in the single-particle
state i. In multi-index notation [97, 216], powers of a
complex vector z = (z1, . . . , zb) ∈ Cb are written as
zn = zn11 · · · znbb , and likewise for powers of the vector
a† = (a†1, . . . , a
†
b) of boson creation operators. This al-
lows the normalized basis ket |n〉 to be written simply as
|n〉 = (n!)−1/2(a†)n|0〉 [see Eqs. (2.19) and (2.21)], where
n! = n1! · · ·nb!.
A general vector in Fs(Hb) has the form |f〉 =∑
n cn|n〉, where cn = 〈n|f〉. The Fock space Fs(Hb) is
also required to be a Hilbert space, the members of which
must satisfy ‖f‖ <∞, in which ‖f‖2 = 〈f |f〉 = ∑n|cn|2.
For reasons to be explained below, the Hilbert-Fock space
defined in this way is also written as H1.
The Segal–Bargmann representation of |f〉 is defined
by the expression [cf. Eq. (2.22)]
|f〉 = F (a†)|0〉, (C1)
in which the function F (z) is defined by the power series
F (z) =
∑
n
cn√
n!
zn. (C2)
If ‖f‖ < ∞, F (z) ∈ C is an entire holomorphic function
of z = x+ iy, where x, y ∈ Rb. This representation of ket
vectors by entire functions is a powerful advantage of the
Segal–Bargmann theory.
In the Segal–Bargmann representation, the inner prod-
uct of two vectors |f〉 and |g〉 is given by the integral
〈f |g〉 =
∫
F ∗(z)G(z)ρ(z) d2bz, (C3)
in which ρ(z) = pi−b exp(−|z|2), |z|2 = |z1|2 + · · ·+ |zb|2,
and d2bz = dx1 dy1 · · · dxb dyb. Functions of the form
F (z) = exp( 12γz
2 + α · z) are of special interest, where
γ ∈ C, α ∈ Cb, α · z = α1z1 + · · ·+ αbzb, and z2 = z · z.
This function is normalizable (i.e., ‖f‖ <∞) if and only
if |γ|2 < 1 [216]. A general bound on all normalizable
states is given by the Schwarz inequality [216]:
|F (z)| ≤ exp( 12 |z|2)‖f‖ ∀z ∈ Cb. (C4)
This implies that the Hilbert-Fock space H1 = Fs(Hb)
is a poor match for the algebra of the ψ product, since
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|f〉  |g〉 is represented by the product F (z)G(z) [cf. Eq.
(2.23)]. For example, the product of F (z) = exp(12γz
2 +
α · z) and G(z) = exp( 12δz2 + β · z) is normalizable if
and only if |γ + δ|2 < 1, but this condition is violated by
many pairs of states with |γ|2 < 1 and |δ|2 < 1.
To find a suitable vector space for the algebra of the
ψ product, it is helpful to consider the family of vectors
|fk〉 defined by
Fk(z) = F (kz), 〈n|fk〉 = k|n|〈n|f〉, (C5)
in which k is a positive integer (i.e., k ∈ N+) and |n| ≡
n1 + · · · + nb. One can easily see that 〈fk|gk〉 = 〈f |g〉k,
in which 〈f |g〉k denotes the inner product
〈f |g〉k =
∫
F ∗(z)G(z)ρk(z) d2bz, (C6)
where ρk(z) = (pik
2)−b exp(−|z|2/k2). This gives rise to
a countable family of norms ‖f‖k = (〈f |f〉k)1/2; note
that ‖f‖1 is the same as the norm ‖f‖ defined by the
inner product (C3). The set of vectors with ‖f‖k < ∞
forms a Hilbert space, which is denoted Hk. The state-
ment |f〉 ∈ Hk is the same as |fk〉 ∈ H1.
According to Eqs. (C4) and (C5), all vectors in Hk
must satisfy
|F (z)| ≤ exp(|z|2/2k2)‖f‖ ∀z ∈ Cb. (C7)
Conversely, to show that |f〉 ∈ Hk, it is sufficient to find
numbers 0 ≤ A <∞ and 0 ≤ λ < 1 such that [216]
|F (z)| ≤ A exp(λ|z|2/2k2) ∀z ∈ Cb. (C8)
From these results it is easy to see that
Hk+1 ⊂ Hk, (C9)
since Eq. (C7) with k → k+ 1 yields an inequality of the
type (C8), with A = ‖f‖ and λ = k2/(k + 1)2.
Let us now define a vector space Fψ = Fψ(Hb) as the
intersection of the Hilbert spaces Hk for all k ∈ N+. Fψ
is defined by the countable family of norms {‖f‖k}, but
it cannot be defined by any single norm. This space is
therefore a Fre´chet space [97, 110], not a Hilbert space.
Such vector spaces are familiar from the rigged Hilbert
space formalism of quantum mechanics [220–225], which
can be used to provide a rigorous justification for the
Dirac bra-ket formalism.
The subscript on Fψ is intended to suggest that this
space is a suitable arena for the algebra of the ψ product.
To show this, we need to prove that |h〉 = |f〉|g〉 belongs
to Fψ whenever |f〉 and |g〉 do. In other words, we must
show that |h〉 ∈ Hk for all k ∈ N+ whenever |f〉 ∈ Hq
and |g〉 ∈ Hq for all q ∈ N+. But this is easily done, since
Eq. (C7) gives inequalities |F (z)| ≤ exp(|z|2/2q2)‖f‖
and |G(z)| ≤ exp(|z|2/2q2)‖g‖; the product H(z) =
F (z)G(z) thus satisfies |H(z)| ≤ A exp(λ|z|2/2k2), where
A = ‖f‖‖g‖ and λ = 2k2/q2. According to Eq. (C8), this
implies that |h〉 ∈ Hk as long as we are free to choose
λ < 1, i.e., q >
√
2k. But this can be done for any
k ∈ N+, by the definition of Fψ.
It should be clear from the above derivation that the
algebra of the ψ product cannot be accommodated within
any vector space defined by a finite number of norms.
Hence, the move from Hilbert space to Fre´chet space is
necessary for boson systems.
What type of vectors belong to Fψ? It was noted above
that F (z) = exp(12γz
2+α·z) is in H1 if and only if |γ|2 <
1. However, Eqs. (C7) and (C8) show that it belongs to
Fψ if and only if γ = 0. The only exponential functions
in Fψ are therefore those of the form F (z) = exp(α · z),
for arbitrary α ∈ Cb. But these are just the coherent
states
|α〉 = exp(α · a†)|0〉, (C10)
which can be defined as eigenvectors of the boson annihi-
lation operators ai (i.e., ai|α〉 = αi|α〉) [121]. Note that
the operator exp(α ·a†) in Eq. (C10) is easy to invert; its
inverse is exp(−α · a†).
Bargmann called the functions F (z) = exp(α·z) “prin-
cipal vectors” and showed that they are complete (al-
though not orthogonal), in the sense that finite linear
combinations of them are dense in H1 [216]. This com-
pleteness is usually expressed as the integral [121, 226]
1
pib
∫
|α〉〈α| exp(−|α|2) d2bα = 1. (C11)
The monomials F (z) = (n!)−1/2zn also form a complete
orthonormal basis [216], corresponding to the original ba-
sis |n〉 = (n!)−1/2(a†)n|0〉 in Fock space.
Finally, note from Eq. (C5) that if |f〉 ∈ Fψ, then as
|n| → ∞, 〈n|f〉 must decrease faster than exp(−κ|n|)
for any positive value of κ. This rate of decrease is
even faster than that of the sequences of rapid de-
scent encountered in connection with Schwartz spaces S
[97, 223, 224, 227, 228].
Appendix D: Different types of particles
Consider a system containing two types of particles,
labeled A and B. If the corresponding single-particle
Hilbert spaces are HA and HB , the vector space of the
whole system can be defined as the tensor-product space
G = Fs(HA)⊗Fs(HB). (D1)
That is, a general vector |u〉 ∈ G is a linear combination
of tensor products |uA〉⊗|uB〉, where |uA〉 ∈ Fs(HA) and
|uB〉 ∈ Fs(HB).
One can define a ψ product in G by letting the ψ prod-
uct of Sec. II C act in parallel on the subspaces Fs(HA)
and Fs(HB). That is, the ψ product of two simple ten-
sor products |u〉 = |uA〉 ⊗ |uB〉 and |v〉 = |vA〉 ⊗ |vB〉 is
defined to be
(|uA〉 ⊗ |uB〉) (|vA〉 ⊗ |vB〉)
= (|uA〉  |vA〉)⊗ (|uB〉  |vB〉). (D2)
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This is then extended to arbitrary vectors |u〉, |v〉 ∈ G
by multilinearity. The algebra thus defined is associa-
tive, which follows directly from the associativity of the
ψ product in Fs(HA) and Fs(HB).
From this definition, it is a simple exercise to show
that the cluster decomposition property of Theorem 1 is
valid in G if it holds in both Fs(HA) and Fs(HB). The
equivalence between the algebra of the ψ product and
the algebra of creation operators discussed in Sec. II D
likewise remains valid in systems with more than one
type of particle.
Appendix E: Invertibility theorem
The first step in the proof of Theorem 2 is to show
that a boson-fermion creator U : E → E is invertible if
and only if its associated boson creator U0 : Fψ(Hb) →
Fψ(Hb) is invertible. The basic reason for this can be
seen intuitively from the matrix of creators (2.34). The
determinant of this triangular matrix is detU = (U0)
2d ,
in which d = dimHf . If we assume that the standard
theorems of matrix algebra can be extended to this ma-
trix of commuting operators, then U−1 exists if and only
if U−10 exists.
A more explicit argument is as follows. Because U0 is
a boson creator, we can use the multi-index notation of
Appendix C to write U0 = F (a
†), in which F (z) is an
entire function of z ∈ Cb and b = dimHb. Invertibility
of U0 thus requires that 1/F (z) is also an entire function,
or that F (z) 6= 0 for finite z. But if F (z) = 0 at z = α∗,
the coherent state |α〉 in Eq. (C10) is orthogonal to every
vector in the image of U0, as shown below. Hence, U0 can-
not be surjective (or onto) in this case. This also implies
that U is not surjective, because |α〉⊗|0〉f is orthogonal to
the image of U . Invertibility of U0 is therefore necessary
for invertibility of U . Its sufficiency follows immediately
from Eqs. (3.10) and (3.13).
To clarify the orthogonality relation mentioned above,
let us start by writing U†0 = F˜ (a), in which a =
(a1, . . . , ab) is a vector of boson annihilation operators
and F˜ (z∗) ≡ [F (z)]∗ is an entire function of z∗. Given
that F (z) = 0 at z = α∗, we have F˜ (α) = 0 and thus
|U†0α〉 ≡ U†0 |α〉 = F˜ (a)|α〉 = F˜ (α)|α〉 = 0, because |α〉
is an eigenket of a. For any |x〉 ∈ Fψ(Hb) we then
have 〈U†0α|x〉 = 〈α|U0|x〉 = 0. But 〈α|U0|x〉 = 0 for
all |x〉 ∈ Fψ(Hb) is precisely the statement that |α〉 is
orthogonal to every vector in the image of U0.
The second step in the proof of Theorem 2 is to show
that U0 is invertible if and only if |u0〉 is a coherent state.
The starting point is the condition F (z) 6= 0 established
above. Now it is well known in the theory of a single com-
plex variable z ∈ C that every entire function F (z) with
no zeros can be written as F (z) = exp[G(z)], where G(z)
is another entire function [229–231]. This is equivalent
to the existence of a global logarithm of such a function
F (z), which depends essentially on whether the domain
of F is simply connected. The single-variable proof given
in Ref. [231] can also be extended to the case of entire
functions of several complex variables z ∈ Cb [232]. In
order for U0 to be invertible, it is therefore necessary that
F (z) = exp[G(z)] for some entire function G(z).
However, according to the results of Appendix C, if
|u0〉 ∈ Fψ(Hb), then G(z) can only be a linear function
of z. That is, F (z) must be proportional to exp(α · z) for
some α ∈ Cb, and |u0〉 must be proportional to one of the
coherent states |α〉 defined in Eq. (C10). The necessity
of |u0〉 being a coherent state is therefore established.
To demonstrate its sufficiency, we only need to note
that the operator exp(α · a†) appearing in Eq. (C10) is
invertible, its inverse being given by exp(−α · a†). Thus,
U0 is invertible whenever |u0〉 is a coherent state. This
concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
Appendix F: Creator identities
A useful identity for the symmetrized product of three
creators A, B, and C is
{A, {B,C}} = {{A,B}, C}. (F1)
This can be derived simply by writing out the definition
of the symmetrized products, which leads to the general
operator identity
{A, {B,C}} − {{A,B}, C} = 1
4
[[A,C], B]. (F2)
Given that A, B, and C are creators, the right-hand side
vanishes due to Eq. (3.6), yielding the identity in Eq.
(F1).
A useful corollary of this identity is the equivalence
B = {U,A} ⇔ A = {U−1, B}, (F3)
in which A and B are creators and U is an invertible
creator. For example, the leftward implication can be
derived from
{U,A} = {U, {U−1, B}} = {{U,U−1}, B} = B, (F4)
since {U,U−1} = 1.
Appendix G: Proof that χ has a global maximum
In Sec. VI B it was shown that, for a given value of ∆t,
the dynamical stability functional has only one stationary
state with χ > 0. To prove that this is indeed the global
maximum of χ, we can follow the approach used in Eq.
(5.19) to obtain the inequality
χ =
(Im〈∆x|σ〉)2
〈∆x|ηˆ|∆x〉 ≤
〈∆x|Σ|∆x〉
〈∆x|ηˆ|∆x〉 ≡ γ, (G1)
36
in which Σ ≡ |σ〉〈σ|. Varying the functional γ leads to
the generalized eigenvalue equation
Σ|∆x〉 = γηˆ|∆x〉, (G2)
which is well defined because ηˆ > 0. However, because
Σ is a projector of rank one, it has only one eigenvector
with eigenvalue γ > 0. This is just
|∆x〉 = −iCηˆ−1|σ〉, (G3)
where C is an arbitrary complex number. Since the func-
tional γ is bounded from above by its maximum eigen-
value, this eigenvalue is the global maximum of γ.
Looking back now at Eq. (G1), we see that choosing
C to be real turns the inequality χ ≤ γ into an equality,
and also makes the eigenvector (G3) identical to the sta-
tionary state (6.15) of χ. Hence, the global maximum of
γ is also the global maximum of χ, and the conjecture is
proved.
Appendix H: Distance between phase orbits
The calculation of D2([ρ], [ρ′]) in Sec. VII C was based
on the assumption that ‖∆u‖ is small. If this is not true,
we must return to Eqs. (7.9) and (7.10) and calculate the
function
λ(φ) = m− tr(ρeiNˆφρ′e−iNˆφ) (H1)
= m−
m∑
k=1
tr(ρke
iNφρ′ke
−iNφ) (H2)
without any approximations. This can be done by using
the resolution of the identity
∑
n Πn = 1, in which Πn is
the projector for the n-particle subspace [cf. Eq. (2.9)].
The result is
λ(φ) = m−
∑
n,n′
Mnn′e
i(n−n′)φ, (H3)
in which
Mnn′ ≡
m∑
k=1
tr(ρkΠnρ
′
kΠn′) (H4)
=
m∑
k=1
〈uk|Πn|u′k〉〈u′k|Πn′ |uk〉
〈uk|uk〉〈u′k|u′k〉
. (H5)
This matrix is hermitian, as can be seen from Eq. (H4).
The function (H3) can therefore be written as λ(φ) =
m−G0 + 2g(φ), in which Gl ≡
∑
nMn+l,n and
g(φ) = −
∑
l>0
Re(Gl) cos(lφ) +
∑
l>0
Im(Gl) sin(lφ). (H6)
Hence, in Eq. (7.9), minimizing λ(φ) is the same as min-
imizing g(φ). This is easy to do in fermion systems with
small d = dimHf , because l ≤ d. The minimum of g(φ)
can then be found quickly using a simple grid search and
Newton’s method.
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